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“Market discipline”—the theory that short-term creditors can 
efficiently rein in bank risk through their self-interested actions—has been 
a central pillar of banking regulation since the late 1980s, both in the 
United States and abroad. While market discipline did not prevent the 
buildup of bank risk that caused the recent financial crisis, the 
conventional wisdom has been that this failure was due to extrinsic factors 
that impeded the effective operation of market discipline, rather than any 
underlying problems with the theory itself. As a result, policymakers have 
increased regulatory reliance on market discipline, making this a central 
part of their reform efforts. This Article challenges the prevailing wisdom 
and makes two contributions to the literature. First, I demonstrate that 
market discipline failed more severely and completely than has previously 
been acknowledged. A foundational premise of market discipline is that 
investors will signal elevated bank risk through higher prices and lower 
liquidity. But as I illustrate, there was no such reaction until after the 
financial crisis had already begun, despite historically high levels of bank 
riskSecond, I attempt to explain why market discipline failed so completely 
and fundamentally. I contend that the theory of market discipline relies too 
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heavily on investors that are relatively insensitive to risk and thus serve as 
particularly poor monitors of banks, and wrongly ignores the effects of 
bank shareholders, who are highly risk-sensitive but may have incentives 
adverse to those of public policy. Both of these flaws with the doctrine of 
market discipline arise from its conflation of capital market investors, who 
generally are quite sensitive to risk, and purchasers of money instruments, 
who generally are not. Despite these enormous flaws with the underlying 
doctrine, improving the conditions for market discipline continues to be 
seen as a panacea for reducing systemic risk, thus increasing the 
likelihood that regulators may again be blindsided by another financial 
crisis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of market discipline, which generally asserts that self-
interested creditors can provide substantial assistance in reining in the 
risk-taking of banks, has been a foundational principle of bank prudential 
regulation since at least the late 1980s.
1
 Since that time, this doctrine has 
become even more important as the principle of market discipline now 
stands as one of the three so-called “pillars” of banking regulation 
articulated by the influential Basel Committee, which sets the international 
standards for prudential regulation of financial firms.
2
 Following the 
financial crisis of 2007–2008, market discipline has been utilized to an 
even greater extent as a way to augment and improve the regulation of 
financial intermediaries.
3
 As financial institutions have become too large 
and complex for regulators to understand and oversee on their own, 
 
 
 1. See infra notes 37–101 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 299–305 and accompanying text. 
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regulators have come to rely heavily on market discipline, both to directly 
rein in bank risk and to provide them with important pricing signals of 
which institutions may be seen as higher risk by the markets.
4
 
Clearly, market discipline did not succeed in preventing the buildup of 
bank risk that caused the financial crisis. However, the consensus among 
most banking regulators and academics is that the failure of market 
discipline in this regard was due to some structural impediment, such as 
the presence of implicit guarantees creating moral hazard or informational 
asymmetries in financial intermediation, which impeded bank creditors 
from effectively monitoring and influencing bank behavior.
5
 In other 
words, under this view, market discipline did not fail, but rather 
policymakers and regulators failed in establishing the predicate conditions 
for market discipline to be successful. 
Based in large part on this diagnosis, one of the ways in which 
policymakers have sought to reform financial regulation has been to call 
for measures meant to improve the conditions for market discipline, with 
the goal of increasing its effectiveness. Both Dodd-Frank and Basel III 
explicitly call for enhanced market discipline, and federal banking 
regulators have unveiled a number of measures meant to increase reliance 
on market discipline, as described in greater detail below.
6
  
But as this Article demonstrates, this conventional wisdom is wrong, as 
the doctrine of market discipline failed completely, in a manner 
inconsistent with these explanations. Investor and market reactions did 
not, as many advocates of market discipline predicted, prevent the buildup 
of risk that caused the crisis, a fact that is fairly indisputable. But more 
troublingly, as this Article demonstrates, the bank
7
 creditors and 
 
 
 4. See infra Part V.C. 
 5. See infra Part IV.A.  
 6. See infra notes 303–20 and accompanying text.  
 7. The term “bank” is also used somewhat inconsistently in the literature. Using a functional 
approach, the term “bank” often refers to a financial firm that engages in the functions of banking—
credit intermediation, money creation, payment services—but also frequently describes a more specific 
type of financial intermediary that takes deposits and utilizes these to fund an investment portfolio 
made up primarily of credit products (such as loans). See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. 
MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 38–48 (5th ed. 2013). The 
term “bank” is also used to describe financial institutions that perform the economic functions 
associated with banking—credit intermediation, liquidity transformation, maturity transformation. To 
some degree, the confusion over the parameters of the term “bank” is also a product of U.S. 
exceptionalism. The United States is unique among advanced economies insofar as it historically 
limited the activities that deposit-taking banks could engage in. Id. at 105–63. Thus, in the United 
States, terms like “traditional bank” or “commercial bank” are often used to distinguish deposit-taking 
financial intermediaries from investment banks, hedge funds, and other capital market-centric firms 
that have historically been focused on capital market activities. Conversely, in Europe and Asia, 
deposit-taking intermediaries were historically allowed to engage in a wide array of other activities, 
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counterparties that were supposed to exert market discipline failed to even 
respond to heightened bank risk until it was too late.  
As Part II of this Article describes, market discipline was supposed to 
reduce bank risk through two main effects. First, the reactions of interested 
investors—withdrawing funds and/or demanding higher rates of return 
from banks taking on greater levels of risk—were themselves supposed to 
act as a check on the behavior of bank managers, by providing a deterrent 
(less availability and a higher cost of funds) to taking on greater risk. 
Second, these market reactions would help to identify risky banks for 
regulators, who could use these pricing and liquidity signals as a basis for 
taking early regulatory action against risky institutions, before that risk 
manifested itself into insolvency. Part II also provides a general overview 
of the parameters of the doctrine of market discipline, and reviews the pre-
crisis empirical and theoretical literature on market discipline and its 
effectiveness in reducing bank risk. 
A foundational premise of this theory is that creditors can accurately 
and timely identify risky financial institutions. This should have been 
especially true for the period preceding the financial crisis, as the 
conditions were ripe for the success of market discipline, as I discuss in 
Part III. The explicit adoption of market discipline as a core pillar of 
traditional banking regulation beginning in the late 1980s facilitated 
greater transparency from banks and other financial firms, and created new 
classes of uninsured creditors who were expected to serve as potent new 
sources of market discipline. At the same time, the rise of “shadow 
banking”—credit intermediation that took place primarily in the capital 
markets and thus outside the prudential regulatory framework established 
for traditional banking—created arguably the optimal conditions for 
market discipline to succeed. Shadow banking lacks the distortive 
government guarantees of traditional banking, and moreover has other key 
aspects that improve conditions for market discipline, such as 
sophisticated counterparties and the presence of delegated monitors of 
risk. 
 
 
and so the term “bank” is often used in a much broader sense. See generally Hwa-Jin Kim, Toward 
Transatlantic Convergence in Financial Regulation (U. of Michigan Law & Economics, Research 
Paper No. 11-004, 2011). See also Charles W. Calomiris, Universal Banking and the Financing of 
Industrial Development (The World Bank Working Paper No. 1533, 1995). Of course, with the rise of 
bank holding companies and the expansion of the scope of permissible activities those firms have been 
allowed to engage in, the term “bank” has become even more muddled over time. For purposes of 
clarity, I describe financial intermediaries that rely heavily on deposits to fund their activities as 
“traditional” or “commercial” banks, whereas I use the term “bank” or “financial intermediary” to 
describe financial institutions that primarily engage in the economic activity of credit intermediation. 
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But despite the best possible conditions to date for the success of 
market discipline, this theory failed systemically and completely, as Part 
III describes in some detail. Every significant market indicator that might 
have been relied upon by banking regulators utilizing the theory of market 
discipline—uninsured deposit rates, bank subordinated debt rates, 
interbank lending rates, credit default swap prices, and many others—
failed to provide any indication of elevated levels of risk until after the 
2007–2008 crisis had already started, at which point it was too late for 
regulators to react effectively.  
This is problematic, insofar as there was clear, publicly available, and 
ample evidence of heightened bank risk, both at specific firms and across 
the broader banking system, as early as 2005. In short, market discipline 
failed more completely and systematically than has generally been 
understood, or at least acknowledged. 
Part IV shifts to the question of why market discipline failed. It begins 
by rejecting the standard accounts for this failure, which largely center 
upon information asymmetry specific to shadow banking, and moral 
hazard created by legal or regulatory policies (such as implicit government 
guarantees for “too big to fail” institutions or bankruptcy laws that favored 
counterparties in certain types of transactions). As I go over in some 
detail, these accounts are inconsistent with the actual evidence of the 
actions (or inactions) taken by bank creditors and counterparties, and thus 
do not appear to be good explanations of why market discipline did not 
perform as regulators and policymakers had expected. If these theories 
were correct, we would have expected to see dampened market reactions 
to risk, both before and during the crisis. Instead, what we experienced 
was a nearly complete absence of market sensitivity to bank risk until July 
2007, after which point markets became hypersensitive to risk. 
Instead, I argue that market discipline failed for two reasons—first, 
relying on the insights of Eugene Fama’s efficient markets hypothesis, the 
theory of market discipline assumes that all investors in banking liabilities 
are always risk-sensitive; second, it generally ignores the actions of bank 
shareholders and the effects these might have on bank risk-taking. Both of 
these failures are derived from a central problem with market discipline, 
namely, that it does not distinguish between capital market investors, who 
generally are quite risk-sensitive, and purchasers of money instruments, 
who generally are not. Market discipline relies most heavily on the latter, 
while largely ignoring the former. 
While this Article does not aim to offer a comprehensive set of detailed 
policy prescriptions, it does briefly explore some of the obvious policy 
implications of these arguments in Part V. First, many of the post-crisis 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/5
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initiatives to reform the financial system are misguided. Among other 
things, Dodd-Frank and Basel III propose reducing investor expectations 
of government bailouts, increasing the issuance of long-term bank debt, 
and improving transparency. As I describe, these proposals are unlikely to 
result in the expected benefits, and may indeed be counterproductive to 
systemic stability. Second, contrary to the efforts of the corporate 
governance movement, this Article proposes delinking the incentives of 
managers and shareholders. Bank shareholders have unique incentives to 
increase risk-taking, particularly during periods of credit expansion. 
Aligning the incentives of bank managers with shareholders is thus not in 
the interests of prudential regulation, which seeks to limit bank risk-
taking. Finally, the realization that market discipline is flawed establishes 
the need for more aggressive action in other areas, including increasing 
capital requirements and reducing the size and complexity of the largest 
financial institutions. Regulators have come to rely heavily on market 
discipline as a supplementary tool, and so reducing reliance on this third 
pillar of banking regulation necessarily means bolstering their ability to 
rein in bank risk in other areas. 
II. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 
The theory of market discipline in banking is related to the efficient 
markets hypothesis
8
 and generally asserts that depositors (and similarly 
situated investors)
9
 can rein in the risk taken by banks through market-
 
 
 8. As a pair of Federal Reserve Bank of New York economists have described, “In its most 
basic form, market discipline corresponds to the semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis 
. . . as applied to traded bank securities, and implies that prices should reflect all available public 
information about risk.” Adam B. Ashcraft & Hoyt Bleakley, On the Market Discipline of 
Informationally Opaque Firms: Evidence from Bank Borrowers in the Federal Funds Market 3 n.2 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 257, 2006). The efficient markets hypothesis was most 
notably advanced by Eugene Fama in 1970, who argued that markets immediately and accurately 
reflect information through the pricing of widely traded securities. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). 
 9. As described in greater detail infra in Part II.C, the literature on market discipline has 
historically focused on the risk taken by commercial banks—institutions that accept demand deposits 
and use these to fund loans held to term—and has primarily described the discipline provided by bank 
depositors. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Market Discipline Revisited, 14 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 187 
(1995); Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Commentary, Market Discipline by Depositors: A 
Summary of the Theoretical and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (1988). Of course, 
similar types of discipline can be exercised by similarly situated investors (such as senior unsecured 
creditors) and can be applied to similarly situated types of financial institutions (such as so-called 
“shadow banks” that carry out the basic intermediation functions of banks). Generally, and consistent 
with the literature, I use the terms “depositor discipline” and “market discipline” interchangeably.  
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based mechanisms.
10
 Market discipline is derived from a broader 
literature, related to the efficient markets hypothesis, which argues that in 
the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries, markets 
reach efficient outcomes, and that governmental intervention can distort 
market incentives to reduce risk-taking and lead to less than optimal 
outcomes.
11
 Advocates of this doctrine have argued that measures that 
increased market discipline would improve the safety and soundness of 
banks, both by exerting some increased measure of direct discipline, and 
by providing banking regulators with important market signals on bank 
risk.
12
 
While market discipline is now one of the core paradigms in banking 
regulation, this was not always the case. In fact, until the 1980s, the basic 
precepts of this doctrine were considered and then explicitly rejected. This 
Part provides a brief overview of the theory of market discipline, and how 
it interrelates with federal deposit insurance and banking panics, before 
proceeding into a summary of the empirical and theoretical literature 
examining the efficacy of market discipline prior to the 2007–2008 
financial crisis. 
A. Federal Deposit Insurance and the Problem of Banking Panics 
Banks are typically understood as having several key features that 
make them unique among market participants.
13
 First, banks are primarily 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying on Depositors to Control Bank 
Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129, 129 n.1 (1986); Constantinos Stephanou, Rethinking Market Discipline 
in Banking: Lessons from the Financial Crisis 4 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 5227, 2010); 
Macey & Garrett, supra note 9, at 223–29. As Kostas Tsatsaronis (2004) notes, “Market discipline can 
be viewed generally as the influence that ‘outsiders’ (that is, stakeholders with no executive decision 
making power) exert on ‘insiders’ (that is, the decision-makers in an economic unit) that encourages 
value enhancing behavior by the latter.” Kostas Tsatsaronis, Comments on the Theory of Market 
Discipline, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 79, 79 (Claudio Borio et al. 
eds., 2004). 
 11. One famous application of this idea is seen in Sam Peltzman’s controversial argument that 
government regulations mandating safety belts in automobiles had led drivers to increase their risk-
taking. See generally Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 
677 (1975). Peltzman was and remains a leading advocate of market discipline. See, e.g., Sam 
Peltzman, Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation, 78 
J. POL. ECON. 1 (1970) [hereinafter Capital Investment] (arguing that the introduction of federal 
deposit insurance and prudential regulation led to declines in bank capital). 
 12. See Mark J. Flannery, The Faces of “Market Discipline”, 20 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 107, 109–10 
(2001).  
 13. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983); Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Banking in General 
Equilibrium 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 1647, 1985); V.V. Chari & 
Ravi Jagannathan, Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium (Fed. Reserve 
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in the business of making idiosyncratic investments with high evaluation 
and monitoring costs, creating potential information asymmetries between 
banks and their outside investors.
14
 Second, banks have a maturity 
mismatch between their assets and liabilities, insofar as they use short-
term liabilities (such as deposits redeemable upon demand) to fund long-
term assets (such as loans).
15
 Third, banks are funded by an unusually high 
level of debt, with only a small amount of equity to serve as a buffer 
against losses on those debt obligations.
16
 Collectively, these attributes 
make banks highly vulnerable to the problem of bank runs.
17
  
The high level of debt means that a relatively small credit loss can 
render a bank insolvent. At the same time, the informational asymmetries 
inherent in banking mean that depositors do not know whether a particular 
sign of bank problems (such as long lines of people seeking to withdraw 
their funds) is an indication that the bank is insolvent. Finally, the maturity 
mismatch of bank assets and liabilities means a bank does not have 
sufficient liquid assets to pay off more than a very small fraction of its 
liabilities at any given time. If a large number of depositors 
simultaneously seek to withdraw their funds from the same bank, that 
bank must find new sources of liquidity, and this may entail selling off its 
loans in a “fire sale” environment. As Diamond and Dybvig famously 
demonstrated, bank runs can thereby cause even healthy, well-managed, 
 
 
Bank of Minneapolis, Working Paper No. 320, 1988). Money creation and payment services, which I 
discuss later in this Article, are also key functions of banks. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 39–
43. 
 14. See Bernanke & Gertler, supra note 13, at 1–2.  
 15. Id.  
 16. See id. at 2. As Bernanke and Gertler note, the high degree of debt used to fund bank lending 
is interconnected with the informational asymmetry inherent to banking. Since a bank has vastly 
superior information about the status of its loan portfolio, a principal-agent problem exists in which 
outsiders may be reluctant to accept equity shares that entitle them to a residual share of the bank’s 
profits, since the value of these are contingent on this information. Id. at 2–4. 
 17. As Patricia McCoy succinctly states, “The unstable balance sheet of banks is not a quirk. 
Rather, it is inherent to a key economic function of banks, which is providing financial liquidity.” 
Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance: Theory and Practice 4 (Feb. 
18, 2007) (unpublished manuscript prepared for presentation at Seminar on Current Developments in 
Monetary and Financial Law), available at http://works.bepress.com/patricia_mccoy1/18/. The fact 
that banks are so fragile raises the question of whether banks are necessary. There is broad literature 
on the value provided by banks. Generally, banks are thought to serve several key functions in 
capitalist economies, whose benefits far outweigh the negative external costs created by bank runs and 
panics. The maturity or liquidity transformation provided by banks, which is a key factor in their 
vulnerability to runs and panics, takes unproductive excess capital and redirects it to productive 
purposes. Banks also play an essential role in the regulation of the money supply, as their core activity 
of financial intermediation is essentially one of creating money. Banks also serve a vital role in the 
payments system. See, e.g., CARNELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 54–56; Morgan Ricks, Regulating 
Money Creation After the Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 75, 76 (2011). 
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well-capitalized banks to fail, by forcing them to liquidate profitable assets 
at a loss.
18
 In the aftermath of a bank run, it is sometimes difficult to tell 
whether a bank’s failure was because it was already insolvent from credit 
losses, or its insolvency was only caused by a lack of liquidity. 
Because of this dynamic, bank runs can be self-fulfilling prophecies. 
As Bank of England Governor Sir Mervyn King has said, “it [is] not 
rational to start a bank run[,] but [it is] rational to participate in one once it 
has started.”
19
 Once a bank run has started, it does not matter whether this 
run is based on economic fundamentals or not, as the liquidity shortfalls 
created by a bank run can themselves cause insolvency. Depositors are not 
well positioned to know whether a bank being run upon has a weak or 
strong investment portfolio, but they do know that those who are last to 
withdraw their funds will find themselves with the largest losses.
20
 
Moreover, bank runs can quickly lead to the problem of contagion, in 
which a run on one bank causes deteriorating confidence among 
depositors at other banks, leading to further bank runs. If these runs reach 
a critical mass, they can cause systemic dislocation and large economic 
losses, as banks across the system are forced to fire sale illiquid assets at a 
loss in order to meet increasing redemptions by depositors. In other words, 
contagion can quickly turn runs on individual banks into system-wide 
banking panics.
21
 Such banking panics can lead to enormous costs across 
 
 
 18. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 13. Diamond and Dybvig suggest that bank runs could 
be triggered by anything, such as a “bad earnings report, a commonly observed run at some other 
bank, a negative government forecast, or even sunspots.” Id. at 410. This “sunspot” model of bank 
runs contrasts with the “information-driven” model of bank runs, in which runs are the result of some 
depositors responding to newly available information about the riskiness of an institution. See 
generally Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring 
Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497 (1991); Chari & Jagannathan, supra note 13. 
Calomiris and Gorton have a good summary of the debate between advocates of the sunspot model and 
those arguing for the information-driven model of banking panics. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary 
Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation, in FINANCIAL MARKETS 
AND FINANCIAL CRISES 109, 109–11, 120–29 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991). Regardless of which side 
of the debate is correct, it is worth noting that healthy banks are vulnerable to runs, as even under the 
information-driven view of bank runs, it is generally undisputed that false information can cause runs 
as easily as accurate information. Id. 
 19. Wolfgang Münchau, Europe Is Risking a Bank Run, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013, 8:25 PM), 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b501c302-8cea-11e2-aed2-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3X1eIf9RH.  
 20. See generally Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 13. 
 21. As Calomiris and Gorton note, the terms “bank run” and “banking panic” are somewhat ill-
defined and occasionally used interchangeably. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 18, at 112. Consistent 
with Calomiris and Gorton, this Article generally uses the term “bank run” to describe a sudden surge 
of redemption requests by depositors and other short-term liability holders of a single bank, and uses 
the term “banking panic” to describe an event where runs occur contemporaneously on a large number 
of banks. Id.  
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the broader economy, as we experienced in the Great Depression.
22
  
Federal deposit insurance, which was first introduced in the 1930s,
23
 
effectively solves the problem of banking panics by providing depositors 
with a credible source of confidence their funds will be repaid and thus 
removing any credit risk-related reasons to withdraw their funds from 
banks. Indeed, the first several decades following the introduction of 
federal deposit insurance were an era of remarkable and unprecedented 
financial stability. Bank runs became virtually nonexistent,
24
 and the U.S. 
banking system did not experience a banking panic until 2008.
25
 There 
were also very few bank failures until the 1980s.
26
 Perhaps as a result of 
 
 
 22. The banking panics of the Great Depression led to unemployment rates near twenty-five 
percent, and real GDP declines of more than twenty-five percent from peak-to-trough. See Christina D. 
Romer, Lessons from the Great Depression for Economic Recovery in 2009 (Mar. 9, 2009) 
(unpublished remarks prepared for presentation at the Brookings Institution), available at 
www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/2009/3/09%20lessons/0309_lessons_romer.pdf. As Reinhart and 
Rogoff have observed in their comprehensive review of financial crises, banking panics inevitably lead 
to enormous macroeconomic costs, resulting in sharp decreases in tax revenues that, on average, cause 
government debt to increase by eight to six percent in the three years following such a panic. CARMEN 
M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL 
FOLLY 142 (2009).  
 23. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.) (establishing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to provide deposit 
insurance for banks). Federal deposit insurance for thrifts was introduced with the National Housing 
Act of 1934’s creation of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which offered 
deposit insurance that was mandatory for federally chartered thrifts and optional for state chartered 
thrifts. National Housing Act of 1934, 12 U.S.C. § 1716 et seq. (2012). See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-54, 
pt. 2, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 351; FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 
THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE FDIC 1933–1983 3–5 (1984), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/firstfifty/index.html.  
 24. Bank runs became a rarity following the introduction of federal deposit insurance and were 
typically confined to uninsured creditors (such as senior unsecured bank creditors or depositors with 
holdings in excess of the deposit insurance limit). See McCoy, supra note 17, at 8. As Friedman and 
Schwartz stated, federal deposit insurance “has succeeded in achieving what had been a major 
objective of banking reform for at least a century, namely, the prevention of banking panics.” MILTON 
FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–
1960, at 440 (1963). 
 25. See Gary Gorton, Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand: Banking and the Panic of 2007, 
at 2–3 (May 9, 2009) (unpublished paper prepared for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 2009 
Financial Markets Conference); Philippe Madiés, An Experimental Exploration of Self-Fulfilling 
Banking Panics: Their Occurrence, Persistence, and Prevention, 79 J. BUS. 1831, 1831–32 (2006) 
(stating that “[s]ince 1933, the United States has known a few isolated and sporadic bank runs but no 
further banking panics.”). 
 26. See Michael C. Keeley, Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1183, 1183–85 (1990); Alan J. Marcus, Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy, 8 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 557 (1984). As economist Alan J. Marcus described in 1984, the empirical evidence 
suggested that banks did not take on excessive risk as moral hazard theory would have predicted. 
Marcus, supra. A review of the empirical literature undertaken in 1990 by economist Michael C. 
Keeley came to a similar conclusion. Keeley, supra.  
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the success of the U.S. experience, government deposit insurance 
programs were universally established throughout the developed world.
27
 
B. Market Discipline as a Critique of Government Guarantees  
Given the broad acceptance today of the theory of market discipline, it 
is easy to assume that market discipline has always been a core tenet of 
banking regulatory policy. But the primacy of this doctrine is actually a 
relatively recent phenomenon, which largely began as a criticism of the 
distortive effects of government guarantees of bank liabilities.
28
 Beginning 
in the late 1960s, as U.S. banks began to take on increased risk,
29
 a 
growing number of scholars began to criticize federal deposit insurance for 
eliminating the incentives of depositors to monitor and discipline banks, 
thus leading to a wholesale mispricing of bank risk.
30
 The rise of market 
discipline paralleled the rise of the “efficient markets hypothesis,” which 
 
 
 27. By 2008, every developed country except Australia, New Zealand, and Israel had adopted 
explicit government-backed deposit insurance. See WORLD BANK, DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND THE 
WORLD: ISSUES OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 5 (Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Edward J. Kane & Luc 
Laeven eds., 2008). Moreover, as Demirgüç-Kunt et al. noted, “every country has a de facto implicit 
deposit insurance scheme (IDIS) in place since governments get pressed for relief at the breakout of a 
large systemic banking distress.” Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Baybars Karacaovali & Luc Laeven, Deposit 
Insurance Around the World: A Comprehensive Database 3 (The World Bank, Working Paper No. 
3628, 2005). In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Australia and New Zealand installed temporary 
explicit government insurance for bank deposits and wholesale funding. See generally Ameeta Jain et 
al., Insuring for a Crisis: Deposit Insurance and the GFC, the Australian and New Zealand 
Experience, 31 ECON. PAPERS 359, 359 (2012). 
 28. It is worth noting that there were some proto-market discipline criticisms of federal deposit 
insurance at the time of its introduction, as some argued that this legislation would eliminate the 
natural incentives of depositors to monitor the quality of their bank’s management. See Mark D. Flood, 
The Great Deposit Insurance Debate, 74 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 51, 59–61 (1992). As Flood 
notes, the American Bankers Association argued at the time that federal deposit insurance would lead 
to a “lack of discrimination as between good and bad banking.” Id. at 60–61 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 29. See Keeley, supra note 26; Marcus, supra note 26. Keeley and Marcus have argued that the 
increased risk-taking in the banking industry that occurred during this period was the result of the 
reduced value of bank charters, due to increasing competition from money market funds and high 
inflation and interest rates.  
 30. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott & Thomas Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some 
Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861–68 (1971) (arguing that 
deposit insurance was mispriced); John H. Kareken & Neil Wallace, Deposit Insurance and Bank 
Regulation: A Partial Equilibrium Exposition (Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Staff Rep. No. 16, 
1977) (arguing that federal deposit insurance had led to increased risk-taking and a misallocation of 
resources); Mark J. Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank Regulation, FED. RES. BANK 
OF PHILADELPHIA BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1982, at 17, 17 (arguing that restrictive bank regulations are 
best seen as “an effort to undo (or at least to limit) the distortive impact” of federal deposit insurance, 
which gives bankers an “artificial incentive to undertake more risk than they would in an unregulated 
and uninsured free market”); Capital Investment, supra note 11 (arguing that mispriced deposit 
insurance had effectively replaced bank capital, leading to increased risk). 
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generally asserts that financial prices accurately reflect all publicly 
available information.
31
 Indeed, the theory of market discipline is best 
understood as a corollary of the efficient markets hypothesis, insofar as 
one of its core assumptions is that the pricing of banking liabilities reflects 
all publicly available information about the bank’s risk.
32
 More broadly, 
critics of the regulatory regime in place for banks increasingly challenged 
the prevailing wisdom, which had dominated banking economics since the 
Great Depression, that banks served a special function, arguing that the 
unique attributes of banking were a byproduct of the special regulatory 
treatment of banks rather than something intrinsic to financial 
intermediation.
33
 In this view, the special treatment of banks was itself the 
problem with banking regulation, with the solution being to adopt the 
same capital markets-based approach to the regulation of banks that 
governed other financial actors.  
The market discipline critique of federal deposit insurance gained rapid 
acceptance in the 1980s due in large part to the struggles of commercial 
banks and particularly the thrift industry. The stagflation of the late 1970s 
and early 1980s had put heavy competitive and earnings pressure on U.S. 
depository institutions, and the deregulation of the early 1980s allowed 
U.S. banks and thrifts to take on much greater risk.
34
 The lower 
profitability and more lenient regulatory oversight that resulted led to a 
large number of failures of depository institutions, which became known 
as the savings and loan crisis.
35
 The United States had not experienced so 
many failures since the 1930s.
36
   
 
 
 31. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 177 (2d ed. 2005). There are three 
different versions of the efficient markets hypothesis: a weak form, in which only historical price data 
is incorporated into financial prices; a semi-strong form, in which all publicly available data is 
incorporated into financial prices; and a strong form, in which all available information, including data 
available only to insiders, is incorporated into financial prices. See generally Fama, supra note 8.  
 32. See ASHCRAFT & BLEAKLEY, supra note 8. Eugene Fama, generally credited with developing 
the efficient markets hypothesis, has posited that a perfectly competitive, unregulated banking system 
would lead to accurate risk-based pricing of deposits, with deposit rates priced equivalently to 
similarly risky investments. Eugene F. Fama, Banking in the Theory of Finance, 6 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 39 (1980).  
 33. See Tim S. Campbell & William A. Kracaw, Information Production, Market Signalling, and 
the Theory of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. FIN. 863, 864 (1980) (noting that Fama and others had 
developed the hypothesis that banks “are merely portfolio managers which would, in an unregulated 
competitive market, earn a competitive management fee. It follows that the unique kind of financial 
intermediation industry observed in the United States is a product of the regulatory environment.”). 
 34. See generally David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 
50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437 (2013). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibout, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and 
Consequences, 13 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 2, 2000, at 26, 33 (“The savings and loan crisis of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1434 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:1421 
 
 
 
 
By the 1990s, the theory of market discipline had come to dominate the 
banking literature, both in economics
37
 and law.
38
 As discussed in greater 
detail below, market discipline was formally introduced into both U.S. and 
international banking regulation with the enactment of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporate Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) and the 
announcement of Basel II, respectively.  
Generally speaking, proponents of this doctrine have made two related 
assertions: first, that depositors and creditors could meaningfully rein in 
risk at banks by acting in their own self-interest; second, that government 
guarantees on bank liabilities
39
 eliminated the incentives for these 
investors to provide such market discipline, creating a form of moral 
hazard.
40
 In short, as Calomiris and Kahn wrote in one of the seminal 
papers on market discipline, in the absence of federal deposit insurance 
 
 
1980s and early 1990s produced the greatest collapse of U.S. financial institutions since the Great 
Depression. Over the 1986–1995 period, 1,043 thrifts with total assets of over $500 billion failed.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market 
Discipline: Some New Evidence, FED. RES. BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP., Sept.–Oct. 1986, at 23 
(suggesting that uninsured deposits and CDs could serve as an important source of market discipline 
for banks); EDWARD J. KANE, THE S&L INSURANCE MESS: HOW DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); Calomiris & 
Kahn, supra note 18 (arguing that demandable debt, such as demand deposits, serve an important role 
in disciplining banks); JAMES R. BARTH, THE GREAT SAVINGS AND LOAN DEBACLE (1991) (arguing 
that federal deposit insurance caused thrifts to take on greater risk); Richard J. Cebula, The Impact of 
Federal Deposit Insurance on Savings and Loan Failures, 59 S. ECON. J. 620, 627 (1993) (concluding 
that federal deposit insurance had “adversely impacted upon the economic health of the [savings and 
loan] industry”); Richard M. Salsman, The Collapse of Deposit Insurance—and the Case for Abolition, 
AM. INST. FOR ECON. RES. ECON. EDUC. BULL., Sept. 1993, at 1, 3 (arguing that federal deposit 
insurance was fatally flawed as a “perverse system that promoted excessive risk-taking”); see also 
infra notes 39–105. 
 38. See, e.g., Richard Scott Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The FDIC 
Improvement Act of 1991, 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 319 (1993) (asserting that deposit insurance 
“impairs the discipline depositors would otherwise exert over depository institutions’ risk-taking”); 
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the Market for Bank 
Control, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (1988) (arguing that deposit insurance removed the incentives 
for depositors to “demand that banks refrain from engaging in risky investment strategies” and thus 
encouraged excessive risk-taking by banks); Macey & Garrett, supra note 9 (arguing generally that 
deposit insurance diminishes market discipline and encourages greater risk-taking). 
 39. In addition to the guarantees explicitly offered to FDIC-insured depositors, it was widely 
believed that uninsured depositors and senior unsecured creditors, particularly those that were 
investors in large banks, enjoyed an implicit guarantee from the FDIC. This was a result of the FDIC’s 
protection of creditors at so-called “too big to fail” banks, as well as its general practice of promoting 
purchase-and-assumption transactions of failed banks, a practice which shielded uninsured depositors 
and creditors from losses, at the expense of the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund. See generally John R. 
Hall et al., Did FDICIA Enhance Market Discipline? A Look at Evidence from the Jumbo-CD Market 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2002–04), available at https://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/analytical/CFR/2004/sept/CFRCP_2004-11_Hall.pdf. The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, 
discussed infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text, was in part meant to end this practice of making 
uninsured creditors whole. 
 40. See, e.g., Baer & Brewer, supra note 37. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 1435 
 
 
 
 
and its distortive effects, investors could discipline risky banks by 
‘“vot[ing] with their feet’”—their “withdrawal of funds is a vote of no-
confidence in the activities of the banker.”
41
 As described below, almost 
all of this literature has been focused on the market discipline exerted by 
depositors and senior unsecured creditors of banks. 
C. The Pre-Crisis Literature on Market Discipline 
Despite its ready acceptance into the mainstream following the 
aftermath of the savings and loan crisis, the theory of market discipline 
remained controversial for some time with many critics claiming that 
improving the conditions for market discipline would not actually reduce 
bank risk.
42
 The question of whether market discipline actually works as 
hypothesized has subsequently been the subject of extensive empirical and 
theoretical research, with the analysis focusing on two key questions. First, 
are bank investors able to accurately monitor changes in bank risk and 
incorporate those assessments into the bank’s security prices? Second, do 
these actions actually influence the behavior of bank managers in a way 
that reduces risk?
 43
  
In summary, the literature generally finds that despite the presence of 
information asymmetry issues, bank investors do exert market discipline 
once banks begin to exhibit clear signs of trouble. However, there is a 
dearth of evidence and significant dispute around the question of whether 
market discipline actually affects bank risk-taking. This is due in large part 
to the ex post nature of market discipline in banking, which typically is 
exerted only after credit losses begin to threaten a bank’s solvency, long 
after risk is actually incurred.  
1. Are Investors Able to Monitor Risky Banks? 
One of the threshold criticisms of market discipline is the claim that 
bank investors are not well suited to monitor and act on changes in risk 
 
 
 41. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 18, at 497. 
 42. See, e.g., Garten, supra note 10, at 131 (concluding that market discipline as wielded by 
depositors would not reduce bank risk); Hall et al., supra note 39, at 1 (noting that the evidence to date 
is inconclusive that market discipline works as its advocates claim).  
 43. See Robert R. Bliss & Mark J. Flannery, Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank 
Holding Companies: Monitoring versus Influencing, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: WHAT WORKS 
AND WHAT DOESN’T 107, 140 (Frederic S. Mishkin ed., 2001) (“Market discipline implies two quite 
distinct notions, which we have tried to separate: private investors’ ability to understand (monitor) a 
financial firm’s true condition, and their ability to influence managerial actions in appropriate ways.”). 
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due to the particular characteristics of investors in bank liabilities,
44
 the 
collective action problem facing these investors, who tend to be 
heterogeneous and small,
45
 and the information asymmetry inherent to 
banks, discussed above. Because many bank investors, particularly retail 
depositors, are unsophisticated, it has been argued that they are poorly 
equipped to receive risk-related information about their banks and likely to 
misinterpret such information because of a lack of financial literacy.
46
  
There has been extensive empirical research on this topic, with the vast 
majority of studies concluding that, despite the information asymmetry 
problems they face, uninsured depositors do attempt to monitor and 
discipline risky banks either by withdrawing their funds or by demanding 
higher interest rates.
47
 For example, Billet et al. (1998),
48
 Park and 
Peristiani (1998),
49
 Jordan (2000),
50
 Goldberg and Hudgins (2001),
51
 
Calomiris and Wilson (2004),
52
 Davenport and McDill (2005),
53
 Maechler 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., Garten, supra note 10, at 138 (arguing that for most retail depositors, risk is only 
one of many considerations in choosing (or choosing not to switch from) a bank, with other 
considerations including convenience, relationships with bank officers, and switching costs). 
 45. See, e.g., S. Nagarajan & C.W. Sealey, Can Delegating Bank Regulation to Market Forces 
Really Work? (N.Y. Univ. Stern Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. FIN-97-8, 1997) (finding that 
subordinated creditors and uninsured depositors will not provide optimal levels of market discipline 
because their interests are not large enough to monitor banks at an efficient level); Campbell & 
Kracaw, supra note 33, at 881 (concluding that the production of risk-related information about banks 
“will not be done efficiently or at least cost” in part because investors have limited resources). 
 46. See Maria Semenova, Market Discipline and Information Costs: Evidence from a Russian 
Depositor Survey 2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://gdresymposium.eu/papers/ 
SemenovaMaria.pdf.  
 47. But see Hall et al., supra note 39 (finding no evidence that jumbo CDs respond significantly 
to changes in bank risk, and arguing that past studies that have found such a relationship have 
potentially conflated the response of jumbo CD investors to regulatory actions with their response to 
market signals of risk). 
 48. Matthew T. Billett, Jon A. Garfinkel & Edward S. O’Neal, The Cost of Market Versus 
Regulatory Discipline in Banking, 48 J. FIN. ECON. 333, 349–51 (1998) (finding that banks experience 
a significant decline in uninsured liabilities around the time of credit ratings downgrades). 
 49. Sangkyun Park & Stavros Peristiani, Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors, 30 J. MONEY, 
CREDIT & BANKING 347, 351–63 (1998) (finding that uninsured depositors (and to a lesser extent, 
insured depositors) avoid failing depository institutions). 
 50. John S. Jordan, Depositor Discipline at Failing Banks, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Mar.–Apr. 
2000, at 15, 20–23 (finding that New England-area banks experienced a sharp decline in the volume of 
uninsured jumbo CDs (certificates of deposit) in the eight quarters prior to their failure). 
 51. Lawrence G. Goldberg & Sylvia C. Hudgins, Depositor Discipline and Changing Strategies 
for Regulating Thrift Institutions, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 263, 267–73 (2002) (finding that uninsured deposits 
declined sharply in the year preceding the resolution of a failing depository institution). 
 52. Charles W. Calomiris & Berry Wilson, Bank Capital and Portfolio Management: The 1930s 
“Capital Crunch” and Scramble to Shed Risk, 77 J. BUS. 421, 433–46 (2004). 
 53. Andrew Davenport & Kathleen McDill, The Depositor Behind the Discipline: A Micro-Level 
Case Study of Hamilton Bank 1, 14–20 (FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2005-07). In 
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and McDill (2006),
54
 and Shimizu (2009)
55
 have found that banks on the 
verge of failure experience an exodus of uninsured deposits.
56
 Their 
findings are supported by Baer and Brewer (1986),
57
 Hannan and 
Hanweck (1988),
58
 Cargill (1989),
59
 Ellis and Flannery (1992),
60
 Kutner 
(1992),
61
 Cook and Spellman (1994),
62
 Brewer and Mondschean (1994),
63
 
and Hess and Feng (2007),
64
 who find that riskier banks pay higher rates 
on uninsured deposits.  
In large part because of the concerns around information asymmetry 
for depositors, regulators have actively encouraged the issuance of bank 
subordinated debt with the intention of creating another, perhaps more 
powerful, source of market discipline.
65
 Unlike demand deposits, 
subordinated debt is not insured, and its investors are typically more 
sophisticated than depositors. Thus, at least in theory, subordinated debt 
should provide a more effective form of market discipline than depositor 
 
 
addition to finding that uninsured depositors exert market discipline, Davenport and McDill also 
conclude, contrary to most of the literature, that insured depositors also exert market discipline. Id. 
 54. Andrea M. Maechler & Kathleen M. McDill, Dynamic Depositor Discipline in US Banks, 30 
J. BANKING & FIN. 1871, 1879–93 (2006). 
 55. Katsutoshi Shimizu, Is the Information Produced in the Stock Market Useful for Depositors?, 
6 FIN. RES. LETTERS 34, 36–38 (2009).  
 56. Generally speaking, uninsured deposits are those in excess of the FDIC’s deposit insurance 
limit. See S. Blaire Bean & John F. Bovenzi, Treatment of Uninsured Depositors and Other 
Receivership Creditors, in MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 245, 254–56 
(1998) (“Uninsured deposit claims are claims filed by depositors whose accounts exceeded the 
federally insured limit.”). 
 57. Baer & Brewer, supra note 37, at 26–30. 
 58. Timothy H. Hannan & Gerald A. Hanweck, Bank Insolvency Risk and the Market for Large 
Certificates of Deposit, 20 J. MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 203, 208–11 (1988). 
 59. Thomas F. Cargill, CAMEL Ratings and the CD Market, 3 J. FIN SERVS. RES. 347, 352–57 
(1989). 
 60. David M. Ellis & Mark J. Flannery, Does the Debt Market Assess Large Banks’ Risk?: Time 
Series Evidence from Money Center CDs, 30 J. MONETARY ECON. 481, 489–501 (1992). 
 61. George W. Kutner, CD Market Response to Continental Illinois’ Liquidity Crisis and Its 
Subsequent Bailout, 28 MID-ATLANTIC J. BUS. 133 (1992). 
 62. Douglas O. Cook & Lewis J. Spellman, Repudiation Risk and Restitution Costs: Toward 
Understanding Premiums on Insured Deposits, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 439, 448–56 
(1994). 
 63. Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean, An Empirical Test of the Incentive Effects of 
Deposit Insurance: The Case of Junk Bonds at Savings and Loan Associations, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 146, 152–56 (1994). 
 64. Kurt Hess & Gary Feng, Is There Market Discipline for New Zealand Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions?, 17 J. INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 326 (2007). 
 65. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 231–37 (2008); see also Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Subordinated Debt and 
Bank Capital Reform (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2000-07) (proposing that 
banks be required to issue subordinated debt to facilitate market discipline).  
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discipline, all else being equal.
66
 The empirical literature on subordinated 
debt discipline generally finds that subordinated debt holders, like 
uninsured depositors, do attempt to exert market discipline on high-risk 
banks.
67
  
Market discipline exerted by other banks—so-called interbank 
discipline—has also been highlighted as a potentially strong source of 
market discipline for a number of reasons.
68
 First, interbank loans are 
typically short duration (often overnight), which allows bank lenders to 
immediately react to new information by demanding higher yields or 
refusing to roll over their loans.
69
 Second, interbank loans are uninsured 
and often uncollateralized, providing bank lenders with ample incentive to 
monitor the risk of their counterparties.
70
 Third, it is generally believed 
that banks are in a better position than other types of investors to analyze 
the risks of other banks because they themselves well understand the 
business of banking.
71
 Fourth, interbank loans are often utilized by smaller 
banks, whom often do not issue subordinated debt.
72
 Fifth, interbank loan 
markets (such as repo) are fairly deep and liquid, which allows for more 
efficient market responses
73
 While the empirical literature on interbank 
discipline is not as well developed as the literature on subordinated debt 
discipline, it has been consistent in finding that banks do attempt to 
 
 
 66. That being said, subordinated debt is better suited for large, systemically significant banks 
than it is for smaller institutions, because of the greater liquidity that exists for the former. See BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE FEASIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY 
OF MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT 7–20 (2000). 
 67. See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu, Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in 
Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991, 51 J. FIN. 1347 (1996); Gary Gorton & Anthony M. 
Santomero, Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt, 22 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 119 
(1990); Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Stiroh, Bond Market Discipline of Banks: Is the Market Tough 
Enough? (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 95, 1999). But see Robert B. Avery, Terrence 
M. Belton & Michael A. Goldberg, Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from 
the Capital Markets, 20 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 597 (1988) (finding no relationship between 
bank bond yields and observable measures of risk); Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using 
Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is It Feasible?, 20 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 147 
(2001) (finding that subordinated debt discipline is less consistent for illiquid bonds). 
 68. See Thomas B. King, Discipline and Liquidity in the Interbank Market, 40 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 295 (2008).  
 69.  See Craig H. Furfine, Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight 
Federal Funds Market, 74 J. BUS. 33, 36 (2001). 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  See Isabelle Distinguin, Tchudjane Kouassi & Amine Tarazi, Interbank Deposits and Market 
Discipline: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe, 41 J. COMP. ECON. 544, 546 (2013). 
 72.  Id. at 737–38. 
 73. See generally Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013). 
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monitor and enforce market discipline with respect to their exposure to 
liabilities issued by other banks.
74
 
In summary, while there are some empirical studies to the contrary, on 
the whole, most of the empirical research has found that market discipline 
may be an effective tool in monitoring and identifying firms that are at risk 
of failure.
75
 It is, however, important to understand how this market 
discipline is exerted. As Bliss (2004) has noted, market discipline can 
potentially be either ex post or ex ante.
76
 Ex post discipline arises in 
response to the actions of bank managers, whereas ex ante discipline 
occurs contemporaneously with the actions of bank managers (and thus 
incentivizes outcomes consistent with the markets’ interests).
77
 
It is well understood that the mechanisms by which market discipline 
in banking is exerted—an increase in the yields demanded by creditors and 
the withdrawal of funds—are ex post forms of discipline, insofar as they 
occur after the bank has already taken on risk.
78
 Advocates of market 
discipline argue that such ex post discipline also provides some ex ante 
discipline, insofar as bank managers may consider the future effects of 
their decisions to take on greater risk, but acknowledge that any such ex 
ante effects are indirect and attenuated.
79
  
The ex post nature of market discipline is further exacerbated by the 
fact that such discipline occurs in response to lagging indicators. As is 
well described in the theoretical and empirical literature, market discipline 
by depositors, subordinated creditors, and bank creditors generally occurs 
in response to signs of potential bank default, such as the amount of 
 
 
 74. See, e.g., Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, Interbank Discipline and Systemic Risk, 28 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 733 (1996); Distinguin, supra note 71 (concluding that market 
discipline is exerted with respect to interbank deposits); Furfine, supra note 69, at 34 (finding that 
“borrowing banks with higher profitability, higher capital ratios, and fewer problem loans pay lower 
interest rates on federal funds loans”); King, supra note 68 (finding that failing banks pay more for 
interbank loans and rely less on these interbank loans than healthy banks).  
 75. See, e.g., Bliss & Flannery, supra note 43, at 109 (“Extensive evidence supports the 
hypothesis that markets can effectively identify a firm’s true financial condition, at least on a 
contemporaneous basis.”). 
 76. This taxonomy was originally proposed by Bliss (2004). Robert R. Bliss, Market Discipline: 
Players, Processes and Purposes, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 37, 
38–39 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 38–39. This taxonomy builds on prior work done by Bliss and Flannery, who 
articulated two distinct concepts in market discipline—the ability of investors to monitor bank risk 
(which occurs ex post), and the effect that investor actions can have in influencing bank behavior 
(which occurs ex ante). Bliss & Flannery, supra note 43. 
 79. See, e.g., Flannery, supra note 12, at 114. 
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nonperforming loans,
80
 bond rating downgrades,
81
 drops in profitability,
82
 
negative regulatory actions,
83
 asset volatility,
84
 and other measures that are 
seen as predictive of impending bank failure.
85
 But of course, there is 
frequently a long lag between the decisions of bank managers to take on 
risk and the manifestation of those decisions into visible signs of bank 
distress. As such, even if market discipline is actually exerted by investors, 
it may not actually impact bank risk-taking. As one commentator has 
argued, it may be the case that creditors wield market discipline “as soon 
as a bad realization of the investment becomes apparent ex post, [but] their 
behavior will not prevent inefficiently high-risk choices by the bank ex 
ante.”
86
 
2. Does Market Discipline Affect Bank Risk-Taking? 
The question of whether ex post market discipline can affect ex ante 
bank actions can be phrased another way: Does market discipline directly 
affect bank risk-taking?
87
 Unfortunately, as a number of commentators 
 
 
 80. See, e.g., Flannery & Sorescu, supra note 67. 
 81. See, e.g., Billett et al., supra note 48. 
 82. See, e.g., Hirofumi Uchida & Mitsuhiko Satake, Market Discipline and Bank Efficiency, 19 J. 
INT’L FIN. MARKETS, INSTS. & MONEY 792 (2009). 
 83. See, e.g., R. Alton Gilbert & Mark D. Vaughan, Do Depositors Care About Enforcement 
Actions? (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2000-020A). 
 84. See, e.g., Gorton & Santomero, supra note 67. 
 85. See, e.g., Hall et al., supra note 39 (utilizing the Federal Reserve’s System to Estimate 
Examination Ratings (“SEER”) model, which estimates the probability that a bank will fail within the 
subsequent two years, as a proxy for risk); King, supra note 68 (also utilizing SEER as a proxy for 
risk); Park & Peristiani, supra note 49 (using a proprietary set of factors to predict the likelihood of 
failure in the following four quarters); Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Sergio L. Schmukler, Do 
Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking 
Crises, 56 J. FIN. 1029, 1035 (2001) (utilizing a set of factors similar to the CAMEL ratings used by 
bank regulators to assess risk, which include capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, 
earnings, and liquidity). 
 86. Jürg M. Blum, Subordinated Debt, Market Discipline, and Banks’ Risk Taking, 26 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1427, 1438 (2002). 
 87. This question has been described in the literature as the difference between “direct” versus 
“indirect” market discipline. As the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department have described, 
“[d]irect market discipline is exerted through debt instruments when expected funding costs are 
sufficiently risk-sensitive that the anticipation of higher funding costs provides an incentive ex ante for 
the depository institution to refrain from excessive risk-taking.” BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RESERVE 
SYS. & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 66, at 24. By way of contrast, “[i]ndirect market 
discipline is exerted through risk-sensitive debt instruments when (1) private parties or government 
supervisors monitor secondary prices of that instrument to assess the riskiness of a depository 
institution, and (2) such parties then take actions in response to a perceived increase in depository 
institution risk.” Id. at 25. In other words, direct market discipline describes the direct effects of 
market discipline on bank risk-taking, while indirect market discipline describes the effects of 
prudential oversight taken in response to market signals. 
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have noted, the vast majority of the empirical research conducted around 
market discipline has focused on whether depositors and other investors 
actually exert market discipline and not on whether this discipline 
influences bank behavior. For a number of reasons, including the difficulty 
of observing market influence, there is a relative paucity of research on the 
question of whether market discipline actually leads to reduced risk-taking 
by banks.
88
 
The limited empirical research asserting that market discipline affects 
ex ante decision making is largely suppositional, lacking direct evidence 
of such a cause-and-effect relationship. For example, Maechler and 
McDill (2006) find that failing banks utilize less uninsured deposits and 
conclude that depositor discipline affects the availability of bank 
financing.
89
 As they note, these findings do “not provide conclusive 
evidence on the effectiveness of depositor discipline in reducing banks’ 
risk appetite,” but do support the hypothesis that such discipline might 
affect bank behavior by “effectively constrain[ing] bank managers’ 
behavior.”
90
 Other studies seeking to address the question of whether 
market discipline exerted by bank investors actually impacts bank risk 
have been similarly speculative in showing causation.
91
  
In short, at this point there is no direct evidence that ex post market 
discipline affects the ex ante decisions of bank managers in taking on risk. 
The handful of studies that have sought to establish a causal relationship 
between market discipline and reduced risk have generally been limited to 
showing that market discipline could theoretically lead bank managers to 
reduce risk, without actually demonstrating that this occurs.   
 
 
 88. See Bliss & Flannery, supra note 43, at 140 (stating that “specific tests of investor influence 
[on bank risk] have been . . . limited” and that “empirical evidence about bondholders’ ability to 
influence firm behavior has been lacking”); see also Davenport & McDill, supra note 53, at 5 (noting 
that because of “the difficulty of observing market influence, the [market discipline] literature focuses 
on evidence of monitoring rather than evidence of influencing”). 
 89. Maechler & McDill, supra note 54, at 1895–96. 
 90. Id. at 1873–77. 
 91. For example, Hoggarth et al. found that banks with higher levels of deposit insurance 
coverage and expectations of implicit government support have lower capital levels, and speculated 
that there might be a causal relationship between the former (which may reduce incentives for market 
discipline) and the latter (a potential sign of higher risk-taking). Glenn Hoggarth, Patricia Jackson & 
Erlend Nier, Market Discipline and Financial Stability, in THE FUTURE OF DOMESTIC CAPITAL 
MARKETS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 125 (Robert E. Litan et al. eds., 2003). Similarly, Distinguin et 
al. establish that banks with greater levels of interbank deposits have lower default rates and higher 
capital levels, and hypothesize a causal relationship between interbank deposits (which they contend 
are a potent source of market discipline) and lower risk. Distinguin et al., supra note 74.  
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3. Strong Form vs. Weak Form Market Discipline 
The question of whether ex post market discipline affects ex ante bank 
behavior has largely divided advocates of market discipline into two 
camps, which I refer to herein as “strong form” and “weak form” 
discipline, as I think this classification helps to understand the theory of 
market discipline.
92
 Advocates of what I call “strong form” market 
discipline believe that the self-interested actions of bank investors drive 
optimal ex ante outcomes, and thus assert that the modern banking 
regulatory regime is mostly unnecessary and counterproductive, displacing 
the efficient outcomes that would occur in the absence of governmental 
intervention.
93
 Under this view, banking regulation is only justified 
because it counteracts the moral hazard effects of federal deposit 
insurance; in the absence of federal deposit insurance and the market 
distortions it creates, banking regulation would be largely or entirely 
redundant, as market participants would efficiently monitor and regulate 
their own interests. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
neatly summed up strong form market discipline when he stated, “Except 
where market discipline is undermined by moral hazard, owing, for 
example, to federal guarantees of private debt, private regulation generally 
is far better at constraining excessive risk-taking than is government 
regulation.”
94
 
Notably and perhaps necessarily, strong form market discipline rejects 
many of the key assumptions that have been central to banking regulation 
since the Great Depression. It has been accompanied by a good deal of 
self-described historical revisionism, particularly with respect to the 
likelihood, costs, and causes of banking panics. Some advocates of this 
view have challenged the previously held wisdom that competition in 
banking had been a key cause of pre-New Deal financial instability.
95
 
 
 
 92. It should be noted that Kwan enunciates his own concept of “strong form” market discipline, 
which is distinct from mine. Kwan uses the term “strong form” market discipline to describe the 
effects of constantly available public information about risk (such as with a publicly traded company). 
Simon Kwan, Testing the Strong-Form of Market Discipline: The Effects of Public Market Signals on 
Bank Risk 2–4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2004-19). 
 93. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.  
 94. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 2003 Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2003/20030508.  
 95. See, e.g., John H. Boyd et al., Bank Risk-Taking and Competition Revisited: New Theory and 
New Evidence (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 06/297, 2006); John H. Boyd & Gianni De 
Nicoló, The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited, 60 J. FIN. 1329 (2005); Marie-
Odile Yanelle, Banking Competition and Market Efficiency, 64 REV. ECON. STUD. 215 (1997). 
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Others have argued that the costs of banking panics were vastly 
overstated,
96
 and that previous experiences with “free banking”—banking 
systems in which there was no federal deposit insurance and minimal 
regulation—were, contrary to conventional wisdom, quite successful.
97
 A 
few have gone so far as to argue that banking panics—the raison d’être of 
federal deposit insurance and the modern banking regulatory regime—are 
a historical anachronism, rendered obsolete today by financial market 
innovations and the provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve.
98
  
Like strong form market discipline, weak form discipline is based on 
the assumption that interested bank investors do provide an important 
monitoring function, and that this monitoring is inhibited by the moral 
hazard problems associated with federal deposit insurance provided to 
traditional banks. But the weak form view disagrees with the notion that ex 
post market discipline actually impacts ex ante bank risk-taking, and it 
also rejects the argument that market discipline is better than government 
regulation at actually constraining risk.
99
  
 
 
 96. See, e.g., Gerald P. Dwyer Jr., Wildcat Banking, Banking Panics, and Free Banking in the 
United States, FED. RES. BANK OF ATL. ECON. REV., Dec. 1996, at 1. 
 97. Much of the historical revisionism of free banking centered upon the “free banking” era in 
the United States, a twenty-six year period between the closure of the Second Bank of the United 
States and the enactment of the National Bank Act of 1863. See Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, 
Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and Shinplasters, FED. RES. BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS Q. REV., Fall 
1982, at 10. In an attempt to replace the banking services provided by the Second Bank, many states 
enacted so-called “free banking” laws, which made bank charters readily available and imposed only 
minimal regulation on state-chartered banks. Id. at 10. This period was generally thought to be a 
catastrophe, as states with free banking laws experienced an extraordinarily high number of bank 
failures. For example, in Michigan, less than two years after free banking was implemented, “all but 
four of Michigan’s free banks closed.” Id. at 11. Eleven of the sixteen free banks chartered in 
Minnesota were closed within five years, and fifty-seven of the seventy-two free banks chartered in 
Indiana had failed in the first few years after free banking laws were passed. Id. at 11–12. Even in New 
York, which is considered the most successful free banking experience of the period, more than twenty 
of the eighty banks organized in the first year of free banking had failed within three years. Id. at 12–
13. According to most historians and economists up until the 1980s, the failure of free banking was 
largely caused by “wildcat” banks, which engaged in widespread fraud and intentionally issued more 
bank notes than their assets could support. Id. at 13. The self-described revisionists pushed back 
against this conventional wisdom by arguing both that the effects of wildcat banks were overstated and 
that the ultimate losses to bank note holders were not nearly as severe as had been previously thought. 
See generally Arthur J. Rolnick & Warren E. Weber, New Evidence on the Free Banking Era, 73 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1080 (1983). This historical revisionism provided some measure of empirical support to 
the mostly theoretical arguments asserting the benefits of competition in banking. 
 98. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 38, at 1157. 
 99. Thus, weak form market discipline also accepts the prevailing wisdom in banking economics 
that there are inherent inefficiencies in banking, including the problem of panics, which are understood 
to create negative external costs. Under the weak form view of market discipline, federal deposit 
insurance solves a real and important concern—banking panics—but also creates problems of its own 
that must be addressed—e.g., moral hazard. 
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Weak form market discipline therefore calls for keeping federal deposit 
insurance in place and adopting market discipline as a supplementary 
prudential tool, meant to provide under-resourced regulators with 
important market signals (price and liquidity changes) on bank risk.
100
 As 
one leading expert on market discipline has stated, “[i]t seems likely that 
investors have a comparative advantage in monitoring, while supervisors 
have a comparative advantage in influencing. If this is correct, then market 
price signals should be used primarily to assure that supervisors act more 
promptly when confronted with a firm that appears troubled.”
101
 In other 
words, weak form market discipline is predicated on the idea that investors 
in bank-issued liabilities can provide information, primarily through 
pricing and liquidity changes, that can “act as an early warning signal” of 
any problems at banks.
102
 
III. THE FAILURE OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 
The financial system from 2001–2007 was perhaps ideally situated for 
the success of market discipline. As this Part describes in greater detail, by 
the early 2000s, the conditions for both weak form and strong form market 
discipline to succeed had been firmly established. In traditional banking, a 
number of important regulatory developments intended to improve the 
conditions for weak form market discipline were implemented, which 
should have created new and robust sources of market discipline and 
armed investors with better and more frequently updated information 
about bank risk. 
At the same time, the rise of shadow banking—credit intermediation 
that falls outside of the traditional banking regulatory umbrella, and thus 
does not have either the prudential oversight or governmental safety nets 
associated with traditional banking—also established arguably the ideal 
conditions for strong form market discipline. Because shadow banking 
does not have formal government backstops, the moral hazard problem 
that presents itself for governmentally insured deposits did not exist.
103
 
 
 
 100. See Flannery, supra note 12, at 108 (noting that many analysts “both inside and outside the 
regulatory agencies” were pushing for the adoption of market discipline to “supplement” traditional 
banking regulation).  
 101. Id. at 116. 
 102.  See Mark J. Flannery & Stanislava Nikolova, Market Discipline of U.S. Financial Firms: 
Recent Evidence and Research Issues, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 
87, 93 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004). 
 103. Of course, in hindsight, it appears that many shadow banking liabilities enjoyed an implicit 
guarantee by virtue of their being issued by a systemically significant, or “too big to fail,” financial 
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Moreover, shadow banking was distinct from traditional banking in a 
number of ways that should have ameliorated the information asymmetry 
issues that were understood to have been a barrier to the effectiveness of 
market discipline in traditional banking. The sheer scale of shadow 
banking—which reached a peak of $20 trillion in global liabilities, a level 
that significantly exceeded the size of the traditional banking system—
provided a broad-scale test of strong form discipline.
104
  
In short, the decade preceding the recent financial crisis was a prime 
laboratory for evaluating the effectiveness of both weak and strong form 
market discipline. And yet what we experienced was a comprehensive and 
nearly total failure of market discipline, as detailed in this Part. Contrary 
to the predictions made by advocates of strong form market discipline, 
investors failed to rein in bank risk-taking in the period preceding the 
financial crisis. More curiously and problematically, neither strong nor 
weak form market discipline reacted to increasing bank risk until the 
financial crisis was already underway, as this Part describes in some detail. 
Whether it was bank debt, interbank liabilities, or asset-backed securities, 
neither the pricing nor liquidity of these instruments reacted in a way that 
would have indicated higher levels of risk until after July 2007.  
A. The Implementation of Weak Form Market Discipline 
Following the implosion of the thrift industry in the 1980s, which most 
commentators attributed at least in part to major regulatory failures,
105
 
policymakers and regulators, both in the United States and abroad, were 
 
 
institution, or because they were part of a “too big to fail” market. As I discuss infra in Part IV, 
subsection A, the presence of these implicit, ex post guarantees over some shadow banking liabilities 
does not affect the broader conclusion that strong form market discipline failed to rein in risk within 
the shadow banking sector. 
 104. See Bryan J. Noeth & Rajdeep Sengupta, Is Shadow Banking Really Banking?, FED. RES. 
BANK OF ST. LOUIS REGIONAL ECONOMIST, Oct. 2011, at 8, available at http://www.stlouisfed.org/ 
publications/re/articles/?id=2165. In the United States, shadow banking accounted for $6.2 trillion in 
known short-term liabilities in 2007, as compared to $4.3 trillion in FDIC-insured deposits in the 
traditional banking system. See Ricks, supra note 17, at 85. There are a number of causes attributed to 
the sharp rise of shadow banking, including the expansion of bank powers, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act’s repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act’s exemption of 
swap derivatives from regulatory oversight, a hands-off approach by regulators who saw the 
development of shadow banking as a positive event, the shift away from bank deposits that followed 
the deregulation of the financial services industry and the implosion of the thrift industry, and flawed 
capital requirements that encouraged capital arbitrage. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet 
Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 
(2009); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 27–37 (2011); Gorton, 
supra note 25; Min, supra note 34. 
 105. See generally Min, supra note 34. 
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quite receptive to the view that market discipline could complement and 
improve bank oversight. They responded by explicitly adopting measures 
meant to improve and facilitate the market discipline of banks. Weak form 
market discipline also came into favor because of the increasing size and 
complexity of the largest banks, which were seen as too large and 
unwieldy for regulators to effectively supervise without assistance.
106
  
Market discipline was first formally implemented into U.S. banking 
regulation with the passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”).
107
 FDICIA implemented a number 
of key reforms to federal deposit insurance that aspired to enhance market 
discipline, including prompt corrective action,
108
 risk-based deposit 
insurance premiums,
109
 and least-cost resolution.
110
 Risk-based premiums 
would create a regulatory analogue to market discipline, it was argued, by 
imposing a higher cost of funding on riskier banks, just as private creditors 
would do. Prompt corrective action and least-cost resolution, which 
removed regulatory discretion to forbear and extend the federal safety net, 
would directly foster market discipline by creating a large class of 
uninsured depositors and other uninsured creditors with no reasonable 
expectation of being rescued in the event of failure. These investors would 
 
 
 106. See Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks Before the Conference on 
Reforming Bank Capital Standards (June 14, 1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990614.htm; Simon Kwan, supra note 92, at 1; Douglas D. Evanoff, 
Julapa A. Jagtiani & Taisuke Nakata, Enhancing Market Discipline in Banking: The Role of 
Subordinated Debt in Financial Regulatory Reform, 63 J. ECON. & BUS. 1, 2 (2011). 
 107. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 108. Prompt corrective action refers to the capital-based classification of depository institutions 
(well-capitalized, adequately capitalized, undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and 
critically undercapitalized) and the progressively more stringent and less discretionary regulatory 
restrictions and requirements that apply as an institution falls into one of the lower capital categories. 
12 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012). For example, an undercapitalized institution faces limits on asset growth and 
must submit a plan for restoring its capital; a significantly undercapitalized institution must 
recapitalize by selling stock or subordinated debt; and a critically undercapitalized institution faces 
receivership or conservatorship. Prior to the implementation of prompt corrective action, bank 
regulators had discretion in dealing with institutions that had capital levels lower than desired. See 
Carnell, supra note 38, at 327–28. 
 109. FDICIA required the FDIC to set up a system of risk-based deposit insurance premiums, in 
which the premiums charged to an individual institution reflected the relative likelihood of losses that 
each institution would cause to the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund. 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) 
(2012). Previously, the FDIC charged the same premiums to all firms, regardless of the risks they 
posed. See Carnell, supra note 38, at 358–59. 
 110. FDICIA requires the FDIC to adopt the resolution method “least costly to the Deposit 
Insurance Fund of all possible methods . . . .” 12 U.S.C §1823(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2012). Previously, the 
FDIC was subject to a less onerous “less-than-liquidation” requirement, which allowed the FDIC to 
use any resolution method so long as it was less costly than liquidation. See Carnell, supra note 38, at 
363.  
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have ample incentives to actively monitor and discipline the banks in 
which they invested.
111
 
FDICIA’s efforts to promote market discipline were subsequently 
bolstered by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision’s 2001 release of 
the New Basel Capital Accord, more commonly known as Basel II 
(because it updated the original 1988 Basel Capital Accord). Basel II, 
which set forth international standards as to the prudential regulation of 
financial institutions, explicitly incorporated market discipline as one of its 
three “pillars” of banking supervision.
112
 The FDICIA primarily sought to 
promote market discipline by creating new classes of uninsured depositors 
and unsecured creditors who would have the incentives to monitor their 
investments and take action against riskier banks. Basel II aimed to 
increase the scope, frequency, and quality of bank disclosures about risk, 
in order to better equip depositors and senior creditors with information 
with which to wield market discipline.
113
 While Basel II was never fully 
implemented in the United States,
114
 federal banking regulators 
incorporated the market discipline pillar of Basel II. This improved 
existing SEC disclosure requirements for banks (and bank holding 
companies) with publicly traded securities by demanding that they provide 
more and better information, such as loan-level data and information on 
off-balance sheet risk exposures, in their regulatory Reports of Condition 
and Income.
115
 
 
 
 111. Id. FDICIA’s goal of creating additional sources of market discipline was re-emphasized 
several years later, with the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. While Gramm-Leach-
Bliley is most famous for formally ending the Glass-Steagall wall between core banking and riskier 
investment activities, it also required that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and the 
Department of the Treasury conduct a study on the feasibility and desirability of requiring 
subordinated debt issuances by banks. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 108, 
113 Stat. 1338. 
 112. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PILLAR 3 
(MARKET DISCIPLINE) (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca10.pdf; see also BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL 
ACCORD (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf [hereinafter THE NEW BASEL 
CAPITAL ACCORD]. The Basel Committee, which is hosted by the Bank for International Settlements 
in Basel, Switzerland, does not possess any formal authority, so it relies on its members to implement 
the banking supervisory standards it develops. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CHARTER (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
charter.pdf.  
 113. See THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD, supra note 112, at 114–33. 
 114. Basel II was applied to the nineteen largest U.S. banking institutions on a trial basis, with the 
final and full implementation scheduled to occur in April 2008. Basel II’s adoption was delayed by the 
onset of financial turmoil in 2007, and U.S. banking regulators subsequently moved to adopt Basel III, 
which was released on September 12, 2010. See generally DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R42744, U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL CAPITAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2012). 
 115. See, e.g., Thomas M. Hoenig, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Should More 
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In summary, an increasing emphasis on market discipline by bank 
regulators and scholars, coupled with several notable legislative initiatives 
to improve the conditions for market discipline, meant that the conditions 
for the success of weak form discipline were as good as they had ever 
been. Policymakers, regulators, and academics alike emphasized the 
importance of encouraging or compelling traditional banks to issue 
uninsured liabilities with the goal of creating new sources of market 
discipline. They also emphasized the importance of encouraging or 
compelling banks to release more detailed, frequent, and usable 
disclosures, so as to help investors make more accurate determinations of 
bank risk. As importantly, regulators were increasingly open to using such 
data to help guide their supervision of banks.
116
  
B. Shadow Banking and the Reemergence of Strong Form Discipline 
At the same time that weak form discipline was being broadly 
implemented for traditional banks, a set of parallel developments in the 
capital markets—the rise of the so-called “shadow banking” system—were 
creating fertile conditions for strong form discipline.  
The term “shadow banking” was coined by Pacific Investment 
Management Company, LLC (“PIMCO”) Managing Director and 
economist Paul McCulley as a term to describe the enormous amount of 
credit intermediation occurring outside of the balance sheets of regulated 
depository institutions.
117
 Since that time, there has been a large and 
growing literature attempting to describe the theoretical and practical 
underpinnings of the shadow banking system.
118
 As with traditional 
 
 
Supervisory Information Be Publicly Disclosed? (May 8, 2003). 
 116. See, e.g., Kevin Warsh, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Financial Markets and the Federal 
Reserve (Nov. 21, 2006) (describing the Federal Reserve’s efforts to improve the quality of pricing 
signals to use as a prudential tool). See also Frederick T. Furlong & Robard Williams, Financial 
Market Signals and Banking Supervision: Are Current Practices Consistent with Research Findings?, 
FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. ECON. REV. 17 (2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/ 
publications/economic-review/2006/er17-29-2.pdf (describing how financial market information has 
been incorporated into the bank supervision process). 
 117. Paul McCulley, Teton Reflections, PIMCO GLOBAL CENT. BANK FOCUS (2007), available at 
http://www.pimco.com/EN/Insights/Pages/GCBF%20August-%20September%202007.aspx. The 
definition offered by McCulley has been broadly accepted. For example, the Financial Stability Board 
similarly defines “shadow banking” as ‘“credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside 
the regular banking system.”’ Fin. Stability Bd., Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues (Apr. 12, 2011) 
(background note), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2011/04/shadow-banking-
scoping-the-issues/.  
 118. See, e.g., Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 
458, 2012), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf;Morgan Ricks, A 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 1449 
 
 
 
 
banking,
119
 shadow banking is understood as performing maturity and 
liquidity transformation by utilizing short-term liquid liabilities (similar to 
demand deposits) to invest in long-term illiquid assets (such as loans).
120
 
Thus, shadow banking creates additional sources of funding for borrowers 
and offers investors alternatives to traditional bank deposits.  
While shadow banking resembles traditional banking at a high level, 
there are some important differences that make shadow banking a much 
better environment for market discipline. First, because shadow banking 
utilizes a complex structure of capital markets funding, rather than 
deposits, to finance its credit intermediation, it is not subject to the robust 
governmental intervention that accompanies traditional banking. Unlike 
traditional banking, shadow banking does not have formal government 
safety nets or strong prudential oversight by government regulators. 
Second, there are fairly profound differences between the typical investor 
in the deposits issued by traditional banks and the typical investor in 
shadow banking liabilities, and this has important implications for the 
information asymmetry issues discussed above. Finally, shadow banking 
has a number of delegated monitors in place, whose role is specifically to 
monitor shadow banking risk. I discuss each of these differences below. 
1. Limited Government Intervention in Shadow Banking  
Shadow banking utilizes a variety of capital market conduits and 
instruments, particularly money market mutual funds, short-term 
repurchase agreements, asset-backed commercial paper, and asset-backed 
securitization.
121
 Like traditional banking, shadow banking uses short-
term, high-quality, liquid liabilities to fund long-term, illiquid loans.
122
 
 
 
Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1287 (2012); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY 
COMM’N, supra note 104; Gorton, supra note 25.  
 119. A traditional bank is understood as an institution that issues short-term deposits and deposit-
equivalents (such as certificates of deposit) and uses those to finance the bank’s investment in longer-
term loans (such as business loans and home mortgages). See ANTHONY SAUNDERS & LINDA ALLEN, 
CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT IN AND OUT OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: NEW APPROACHES TO VALUE AT 
RISK AND OTHER PARADIGMS 3 (3d ed. 2010).  
 120. See David Luttrell et al., Understanding the Risks Inherent in Shadow Banking: A Primer 
and Practical Lessons Learned 5 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Dall., Staff Paper No. 18, 2012).  
 121. See generally Pozsar et al., supra note 118. 
 122. This process is often described as credit intermediation, or alternatively as credit, maturity, 
and liquidity transformation. As Pozsar et al. explain: 
Credit transformation refers to the enhancement of the credit quality of debt issued by the 
intermediary through the use of priority of claims. For example, the credit quality of senior 
deposits is better than the credit quality of the underlying loan portfolio due to the presence of 
junior equity. Maturity transformation refers to the use of short-term deposits to fund long-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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But whereas traditional banking does this all ‘“under one roof,”’ shadow 
banking performs this intermediation “through a daisy-chain of non-bank 
financial intermediaries in a multi step process.”
123
  
So, for example, when we think of traditional banking, we think of a 
loan being held to term by the originating bank, with the funding for this 
loan coming from the bank’s deposits. But in shadow banking, the 
originator of a loan
124
 sells it off to a bankruptcy-remote securitization 
conduit (typically either a special-purchase vehicle (“SPV”) or a structured 
investment vehicle (“SIV”)), which pools a number of other loans and 
sells off securities representing the cash flows from the loan pool.
125
 The 
origination and securitization of these loans is financed predominantly 
through short-term funding coming from the issuance of asset-backed 
securities (“ABS”), asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”), short-term 
repurchase agreements (“repos”), and similar debt or structured credit 
instruments.
126
 These debt instruments are purchased by money market 
mutual funds (“MMFs”), bond funds, and other entities, including other 
securitization conduits that then issue new debt obligations based on the 
cash flows from these liabilities.
127
 The end effect is functionally the 
same—long-term loan assets funded by short-term liquid liabilities—but 
shadow banking utilizes a potpourri of capital market structures to conduct 
this intermediation. 
 
 
term loans, which creates liquidity for the saver but exposes the intermediary to rollover and 
duration risks. Liquidity transformation refers to the use of liquid instruments to fund illiquid 
assets. For example, a pool of illiquid whole loans might trade at a lower price than a liquid 
rated security secured by the same loan pool, as certification by a credible rating agency 
would reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and savers. 
Id. at 5. 
 123. Id. at 10. 
 124. The origination and sale of loans is performed by a number of different types of actors, which 
are generally divided into two camps: traditional banks and non-bank lenders. Despite the fact that 
traditional banks are one important source of loans for securitization, this particular function is 
generally understood to be included in shadow banking and outside of traditional banking. This is in 
large part because the origination and sale of mortgages is not a long-term investment and does not 
require capital to be held against it (other than a temporary hold).  
 125. See SAUNDERS & ALLEN, supra note 119, at 5–11. SPVs are static entities that purchase 
loans (and other assets) and issue asset-backed securities representing the cash flows from those loans. 
The investment-grade ABS issued by these SPVs are then utilized as collateral what in repo markets, 
derivatives transactions, and other types of transactions. SIVs are more dynamic, insofar as they 
purchase assets on an ongoing basis and continuously fund their activities through the issuance of 
asset-backed commercial paper, which must be regularly rolled over.  
 126. See generally Noeth & Sengupta, supra note 104. 
 127. Id. at 9–10 
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Because shadow banking does not directly involve bank deposits, it 
lacks the explicit governmental support provided to traditional banks.
128
 
While some shadow banking liabilities are sponsored by or held by 
traditional banks or bank holding companies, these liabilities, unlike bank 
deposits, are not backed by government deposit insurance, and they do not 
privilege their issuers with access to public sources of liquidity, such as 
the Federal Reserve’s discount window for depository institutions.
129
  
The lack of government guarantees in shadow banking also means that 
shadow banks are not subject to the stringent prudential regulation that is 
in place for traditional banks. Prudential regulation in the United States, 
prior to the financial crisis, historically covered traditional banks,
130
 those 
that take demand deposits and use them to fund longer-term investments 
(such as loans).
131
 Most of the credit intermediation that occurs in shadow 
banking involves entities that were unconnected to the balance sheets of 
traditional banks, including investment banks, broker-dealers, insurance 
companies, money market mutual funds, hedge funds, and special purpose 
entities sponsored by bank holding companies.
132
 As a result, at least up 
until the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the credit intermediation performed 
by these firms fell outside the regulatory umbrella that governs traditional 
 
 
 128. See Luttrell et al., supra note 120, at 6 (“the distinguishing characteristic [of shadow 
banking] remains the absence of explicit public sector backstops. . . .”). Instead of public sector 
guarantees, the shadow banking system relies upon a number of private third-party guarantees, 
including guarantees on the underlying loans (such as mortgage insurance), third-party guarantees on 
ABS (such as monoline bond insurance or credit default swaps), and the “representations and 
warranties” offered by the sponsors of ABS securitization conduits. SeeJohn W. Uhlein, Breakdown in 
the Mortgage Securitization Market: Multiple Causes and Suggestions for Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 503, 508–11 (2010); Pozsar et al., supra note 118, at 2–4, 21–23. As the 2007–08 financial crisis 
made clear, these private guarantees were insufficient to protect shadow banking from the old problem 
of runs and panics. See generally Marcin Kacperczyk & Philipp Schnabl, When Safe Proved Risky: 
Commercial Paper during the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2010, at 29; 
Pozsar et al., supra note 118. 
 129. That being said, governmental support can indirectly enhance shadow banking as traditional 
banks can fund some of these shadow banking activities with FDIC-insured deposits or funds 
borrowed from the Federal Reserve. See Lutrell et al., supra note 120, at 6.  
 130. I use the term traditional bank to refer to depository institutions with bank, thrift, and credit 
union charters. Certain other types of financial institutions were also subject to prudential regulation, 
with the most notable being the government-sponsored housing securitization enterprises Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. 
 131. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 11–34. 
 132. See generally Lutrell et al., supra note 120. Many SPVs and SIVs were sponsored by 
traditional bank holding companies, but their legal structure kept them “bankruptcy remote” from the 
balance sheets of their sponsors. As a result, they were not subject to prudential regulation. See Gary 
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. 
ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 272. 
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banks.
133
 While these institutions were usually supervised by some type of 
financial regulator, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission or a 
state insurance commissioner, they were generally not subject to the strict 
prudential oversight that is the hallmark of banking regulation.
134
  
2. Shadow Banking Investors Are Institutional, Not Retail 
Another important difference between traditional banks and shadow 
banks lies in who predominantly funds their activities. Investors in shadow 
banking are universally large, sophisticated financial institutions with 
access to detailed information about the risk characteristics of their 
investments and counterparties. This contrasts with traditional bank 
depositors, who are typically less sophisticated retail investors who lack 
both the capacity and the information to accurately assess risk. As such, 
these differences have important implications for the information 
asymmetry issues that typically are thought to plague banking. 
Much as with traditional banking, intermediation in shadow banking is 
characterized by information asymmetries between insiders and outside 
investors.
135
 For example, asset-backed securitization, which is at the heart 
of the shadow banking system, involves a series of information 
asymmetries at each stage of the intermediation process.
136
 Similarly, the 
asset-backed commercial paper market has steep “information 
asymmetries between investors and asset managers.”
137
 As discussed 
 
 
 133. During the financial crisis, the largest investment banks engaging in shadow banking either 
failed, were acquired by commercial banks, or converted to bank holding company charters. See FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 280–352. 
 134. See generally Fin. Stability Bd., supra note 117. There was some attempt by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to implement prudential regulation over the largest investment 
banks under its regulatory purview, but this was so light touch and inept as to be almost nonexistent. In 
November 2003, the SEC implemented a voluntary prudential oversight regime for the five largest 
U.S. investment banks called the Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) program. This prudential 
regulation was generally considered light touch, as it was laxer than the regulation provided by the 
traditional U.S. banking regulators, relied more heavily on the firms’ own internal risk regulations, and 
required far less capital. The CSE program officially ended in September 2008 as all of the firms under 
the SEC’s supervision had either failed (Lehman Brothers), been acquired by bank holding companies 
(Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch), or converted into bank holding companies (Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs). See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 280–352. 
 135. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and 
Responsibility Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781 (2013); Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft, 
Shadow Banking Regulation (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 559, 2012).  
 136. See Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, The Seven Deadly Frictions of Subprime 
Mortgage Credit Securitization, THE INVESTMENT PROF. 2, 2 (2008). 
 137. See Adrian & Ashcraft, supra note 135, at 13. Because shadow banking does not enjoy 
formal government guarantees on its liabilities, it has been forced to develop alternative mechanisms 
to assuage investor concerns about these information asymmetry issues. Several of these mechanisms 
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previously, these information asymmetries present a central problem for 
banking regulation, both because they are a critical factor in causing bank 
runs, and because they are thought to be impediments for the effective 
operation of market discipline.  
That being said, the characteristics of shadow banking are perhaps 
ideal for ameliorating these informational issues.
138
 Investors in shadow 
banking liabilities enjoy access to detailed risk-related information, which 
is much better than the publicly available information depositors rely upon 
to discipline traditional banks.
139
 Moreover, because these investors are 
themselves large financial institutions, such as commercial banks,
140
 
investment banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and money market mutual 
funds, they have the capacity to efficiently process and interpret this 
information, certainly much more so than the average retail depositor.  
3. Delegated Monitors to Ameliorate Information Asymmetry Issues 
Shadow banking also has in place a number of important mechanisms 
that, at least in theory, should provide strong market-based risk 
assessments and further assuage the informational concerns of investors. 
In particular, there are a number of well-situated monitors who possess 
both the interest and wherewithal to provide accurate risk assessments of 
shadow banking liabilities.
141
 Three such sets of monitors are worth 
mentioning. 
 
 
are notable: first, the subordinated tranching structure for asset-backed securitization that effectively 
makes the senior tranches of bonds issued safer than the underlying pool of assets; second, the use of 
credit enhancements, such as those provided by insurers or credit default swap counterparties; and 
third, the use of credit ratings provided by the credit rating agencies. 
 138. As I discuss later in Part IV, Subsection A, one notable criticism of the claim that shadow 
banking has better mechanisms to deal with information asymmetry is that shadow banking has many 
more potential nexuses in which information asymmetries can arise, due to the much greater 
complexity of the structures and markets used for intermediation in shadow banking. These 
informational “frictions” have been identified as a major problem in shadow banking. See generally 
Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 136; see also BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT 
TO THE CONGRESS ON RISK RETENTION 14–15 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., Nora Colomer, ABS Industry Makes Sense of Loan Level Data, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REPORT, Dec. 4, 2009, at 10. 
 140. Many commercial banks expanded beyond traditional banking to participate in a number of 
activities, such as repos, the sale and purchase of commercial paper, and the underwriting and 
purchase of asset-backed securities, which were part of the shadow banking system. See generally FIN. 
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104. 
 141. Some have coined the term “financial gatekeeper” to refer to this role in the context of equity 
investments. See generally FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? (Yasuyuki 
Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006). 
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First, there are the sponsors of asset-backed securitization conduits, 
typically investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs, or bank holding 
companies, such as Citigroup. These firms provide a number of different 
types of guarantees to ABS and ABCP investors, all of which should give 
them incentives to closely monitor the credit quality of the assets in the 
pool. ABS conduit sponsors typically provide representations and 
warranties as to the quality of the assets collateralizing these securities.
142
 
They also often purchase the most subordinated securities, ensuring that 
they will take the first loss on any asset degradation and thus providing a 
buffer against losses for other investors.
143
 Moreover, even though ABS 
conduits are technically independent, off-balance sheet entities, their 
sponsors often provide implicit “reputational” guarantees on losses.
144
 
ABCP sponsors usually provide full or partial support to their conduits, 
which includes an arrangement with a bank (often the sponsor itself) to 
provide liquidity to the conduit as necessary, and, most importantly, a 
guarantee to cover credit losses on the underlying assets (either all losses, 
in the case of fully supported ABCP conduits, or losses in excess of a 
prespecified amount, in the case of partially supported ABCP conduits).
145
 
Because of these factors, securitization sponsors have ample incentives to 
ensure that their conduits do not suffer large credit losses, and they possess 
the necessary information to effectively monitor these conduits.
146
  
Second are the third-party providers of credit enhancement on shadow 
banking liabilities, the bond insurers, and credit default swap 
counterparties. Because bond insurers and credit default swap (CDS) 
counterparties agree to cover credit losses on shadow banking obligations 
 
 
 142. These reps and warranties are made by the sponsor to the conduit (SPV or SIV) itself, which 
is controlled by a trustee. The trustee is legally obligated to act in the best interests of the investors in 
the trusts. See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(2011). These representations and warranties have been the basis for a spate of litigation and 
settlements in the aftermath of the financial crisis. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick, BofA Nears Huge 
Settlement, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2011, at A1; Alison Frankel, Monolines Accuse Credit Suisse of 
Misleading Financial Reports, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2011, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2011/09/20/monolines-accuse-credit-suisse-of-misleading-financial-reports/, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/GND7-W9U6.  
 143. See Mei Cheng et al., Asset Securitization, Securitization Recourse, and Information 
Uncertainty, 86 ACCT. REV. 541, 545 (2011). 
 144. Id.  
 145. SWASI BATE ET AL., MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ASSET-BACKED 
COMMERCIAL PAPER 18–20 (2003). 
 146. Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 attempts to further align the incentives of 
securitization sponsors and ABS investors by requiring that sponsors carry some portion of the credit 
risk from their conduits. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 
111-203, § 941, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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in the event of defaults or similar events, they have significant incentives 
to monitor the credit risk underlying these instruments.
147
 Moreover, prior 
to the financial crisis, these guarantees were often critical for attracting 
investors as they were used to enhance the credit ratings provided to a 
particular security, and because some investors would only invest in 
securities that carried such credit enhancements.
148
  
Both bond insurers and CDS counterparties provide an important 
monitoring function for shadow banking liabilities. Bond insurers have 
access to considerable amounts of information about the securities they are 
insuring—arguably all the relevant information they need.
149
 Additionally, 
they have developed significant expertise in assessing the credit risk 
associated with bonds and structured financial products (such as ABS and 
CDOs), as this has been their core business for several decades.
150
 While 
CDS counterparties do not enjoy the same access to inside information as 
bond insurers, they are universally large and sophisticated financial 
institutions, such as banks, securities firms, hedge funds, and bond 
insurers.
151
 The development of the CDS market in particular was 
heralded as an important means of improving market discipline since it 
provides a clear external measure of risk.
152
 
Collectively, bond insurers and CDS counterparties have a large 
footprint on the shadow banking system. Bond insurers guaranteed more 
than $1 trillion in ABS (including over $700 trillion in U.S. ABS) and 
some $300 billion in CDOs as of September 30, 2007.
153
 CDS reached a 
 
 
 147. See Product Descriptions and Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES 
ASS’N, http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#26 (giving the product description for credit default 
swaps).  
 148. See Sebastian Schich, Challenges Related to Financial Guarantee Insurance, ORG. FOR 
ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. FIN. MKT. TRENDS, no. 94, 2008, at 81, 88. 
 149. See, e.g., N.Y. Bankers Ass’n, Financial Guaranty Insurance and Representations and 
Warranties in Securitized Debt Transactions (Feb. 16, 2011) (written testimony).  
 150. In fact, bond insurers are often referred to as “monoline bond insurers” because they are 
legally limited to guaranteeing these types of financial products. See generally BAIRD WEBEL & 
DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34364, BOND INSURERS: ISSUES FOR THE 110TH 
CONGRESS (2008). 
 151. See EDWARD VINCENT MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22932, CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAPS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2008). 
 152. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS 45 (2009). As I discuss later, Mark J. Roe raises an important objection to the 
argument that CDS counterparties provide market discipline, arguing that the bankruptcy code’s 
prioritization of collateral used to satisfy the margin requirements of CDS effectively obviated any 
need for CDS sellers to perform due diligence, since most potential credit losses would be covered by 
the pledged collateral. See infra note 207 and accompany text. 
 153. See The State of the Bond Insurance Industry: Hearing Before the United States House of 
Representatives Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, & Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the Comm. on 
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peak of $58.2 trillion in notional value (the total amount guaranteed 
against) and $2.02 trillion in gross value (the outstanding mark-to-market 
value of CDS contracts) at the end of 2007.
154
 At least in theory, the self-
interest and expertise of bond insurers and CDS counterparties should 
have served an important market disciplining role on the ABS, CDOs, and 
other liabilities that funded shadow banking intermediation.  
Third are the credit rating agencies, who are tasked with providing 
alphabetically-based credit quality assessments for fixed income 
obligations, including most of the liabilities that were central to funding 
shadow banking intermediation. Credit rating agencies are paid by the 
issuer of the securities they rate,
155
 and utilize a detailed methodology to 
rate structured products like ABS and CDOs, which involves looking at a 
number of attributes at both the loan level, including loan-to-value ratio, 
borrower credit score, borrower debt-to-income ratio, originator quality, 
loan characteristics (such as interest-only or adjustable-rate), and 
documentation status, to name just a few, and at the pool level, looking at 
external credit support (bond insurance and CDS as described above) and 
internal credit support (how much subordinated debt and equity supports 
the top tranches).
156
 After providing an initial credit rating, the rating 
agencies then continue to monitor the securities they rated on an ongoing 
basis to determine whether downgrades are appropriate.
157
  
Rating agencies have access to all of the relevant risk-related 
information about the securities they rate, and have developed significant 
amounts of expertise in doing so given that providing credit ratings is and 
has been their core business for many decades. Prior to the financial crisis, 
the credit ratings provided by these institutions were a critical part of the 
shadow banking systems, as investors largely relied upon AAA ratings as 
a proxy for safety.
158
  
 
 
Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Patrick M. Parkinson, Deputy Director, Division of 
Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board). 
 154. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, OVERVIEW ON DERIVATIVES 3 (2010), available 
at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0630-psr-derivative-overview.pdf.  
 155. The fact that credit rating agencies are paid by issuers has been a source of much criticism as 
it is argued that this creates a conflict of interest in the ratings process. See generally FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, CREDIT RATINGS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 8 (2010), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0602-Credit-Ratings.pdf.  
 156. Id. at 14–19. 
 157. Id. at 20–21. 
 158. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 118–22 (describing the 
importance of AAA ratings for fixed income investors); see also Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit 
Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS, supra note 141, at 59, 
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In the aggregate, shadow banking serves the key credit, maturity, and 
liquidity transformation functions of banking, but without the regulatory 
encumbrances or access to governmental safety nets (particularly central 
bank liquidity and governmental deposit insurance) that accompany 
traditional banks. This structure leaves shadow banking vulnerable to the 
runs and panics that federal deposit insurance is meant to prevent. 
However, it should also remove any moral hazard concerns, as holders of 
shadow banking liabilities are uninsured against loss and thus have ample 
incentives to exercise market discipline.
159
 Moreover, shadow banking 
should be far better equipped than traditional banking to deal with 
informational asymmetry, both because its investors are much more 
sophisticated than retail depositors, and because shadow banking 
developed a number of mechanisms intended specifically to address these 
information issues.  
C. The Failure of Markets to Signal Excessive Risk 
Despite the presence of conditions that may be described as close to 
ideal, market discipline failed to prevent the financial crisis. Heightened 
market discipline in both traditional banking and shadow banking did not 
stop firms from building up historically high levels of credit and liquidity 
risk.
160
 As the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
concluded in its review of the financial crisis, “A reasonable conclusion is 
that market discipline expressed via market prices cannot be expected to 
play a major role in constraining bank risk-taking, and that the primary 
constraint needs to come from regulation and supervision.”
161
 
 
 
59–62 (describing how credit rating agencies play a “gatekeeper” function by providing credit ratings 
that are relied upon heavily by investors).  
 159. As I discuss below in Part IV, subsection A, one response to this line of reasoning is to point 
out that many shadow banking liabilities were, at least after the fact, seen as effectively insured by the 
federal government by virtue of the fact that they, or their issuers, were deemed too systemically 
important to be allowed to fail without support. 
 160.  As the FCIC Report has described, large bank holding companies between 2000 and 2007 
generally had leverage ratios between 16:1 and 22:1. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 
65. Investment banks saw their leverage ratios reach even higher levels, with Goldman Sachs having a 
leverage ratio of 32:1, and Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers reaching leverage ratios of 40:1. Id. 
at 65–66. The liquidity risk for commercial banks is limited by the Federal Reserve’s lending facilities 
and the FDIC’s deposit insurance, both of which are meant to ensure a steady supply of liquid funding 
for these entities, even during periods of financial market distress. But the liquidity risk for investment 
banks reached historically high levels. Id. at 296–98. Two key measures of liquidity risk for 
investment banks are the total percentage of liabilities funded by repo, and the ratio of short-term repo 
funding to total repo funding. Id. All of the major investment banks had high levels of repo funding 
and short term repo funding during the pre-crisis period. Id. 
 161. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 152, at 47. 
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But more troublingly, bank investors failed to even respond to 
heightened bank risk until it was too late.
162
 While investors clearly 
reacted to the systemic problems that arose beginning with the subprime 
liquidity crisis in July 2007, they failed to provide any price signals or 
other indicia of heightened risk prior to that time, even as there had been 
increasing evidence of that risk prior to July 2007.
163
 This was true across 
a wide array of markets and instruments, as I describe below.  
It was not until July 2007, following the credit ratings downgrade of 
over 1000 subprime-related securities by the rating agencies Moody’s and 
Standards & Poor’s,
164
 that market discipline began to operate as theory 
would have predicted, where banks perceived as having higher risk were 
punished more severely than banks perceived as having less risk, as 
discussed in this Section.  
The failure of bank investors to respond to elevated bank risk was at 
odds with the core assumption of both weak and strong form market 
discipline—that market discipline can identify risky banks through price 
and liquidity signals. This Part outlines the failures of market discipline in 
identifying banking and shadow banking risk prior to the crisis, focusing 
on a series of relevant indicators. 
1. Liabilities of Individual Banks Failed to Timely Identify Risk  
Several studies have looked at the market discipline exerted by 
investors in the non-guaranteed liabilities of both banks and investment 
banks. Stephanou (2010) looked at the market discipline exerted on 
various liabilities of major shadow banks from 2006 to 2009 and found 
that none of the key market metrics that should have theoretically provided 
signals on the risk of these financial firms showed any indications of 
elevated risk until August 2007 or later—long after these firms had 
actually taken on this risk.
165
  
Stephanou’s findings are consistent with the observations of Lee, 
Miller, and Yeager (2013), who looked at the yields on subordinated debt 
issues from 2002–2007 and compared those to a number of commonly 
used risk metrics (such as the ratio of non-performing loans to total assets, 
 
 
 162. See infra Part III.C.1–4.  
 163. See id. 
 164. See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 72 (2011); S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 
112TH CONG. WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 31 
(2011) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE]. 
 165. Stephanou, supra note 10, at Appendices I-II. 
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the total leverage ratio, and ratio of real estate investments to total 
assets).
166
 Lee, Miller, and Yeager did not find a correlation between 
subordinated debt yields and higher risk, and thus concluded that 
“[m]arket participants rewarded good performance but did not punish 
increased risk. Overall, these results do not show strong evidence of 
market discipline of banks during the period leading up to the financial 
crisis.”
167
 They are also supported by the findings of the United 
Kingdom’s FSA, which looked at CDS prices for sixteen prominent U.S. 
and European financial firms and found that these prices “did not provide 
forewarning of the scale of problems ahead . . . [and instead] suggested 
that risks were at historically low not historically high levels.”
168
 
These findings are bolstered by Figures 1–6 below, which illustrate the 
CDS prices, senior debt yields, and subordinated debt yields from 2004 to 
late 2008 for Citigroup, a bank holding company that also had significant 
investment banking activities, and Merrill Lynch, an investment bank.
169
 
Both of these firms had accumulated very high levels of mortgage-related 
risk and consequently suffered major losses.
170
 These charts, which are 
representative of the data for all large commercial and investment 
banks,
171
 demonstrate quite clearly that the investors in these individual 
bank liabilities did not react until after July 2007, and often not until quite 
later. 
What is particularly striking about these findings, and the findings of 
Stephanou and Lee, Miller, and Yeager, is the clear evidence that these 
key market-based price signals, which were generally understood as 
highly reliable quantitative indicators of insolvency risk,
172
 failed to 
provide any indication of higher risk during the period preceding the 
financial crisis. Even as financial firms took on high levels of exposure to 
U.S. mortgages, U.S. households became historically overleveraged, and 
 
 
 166. Kevin K. Lee et al., Market Discipline and Bank Subordinated Debt Yields During the Lead 
up to the Financial Crisis (unpublished manuscript, 2013), available at http://cbt2.nsuok.edu/kwok/ 
conference/submissions/swfa2013_submission_65.docx. 
 167. Id. at 14. 
 168. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 152, at 46. 
 169. Of course, Merrill Lynch was acquired by Bank of America, a bank holding company, in a 
deal that was first announced on September 14, 2008. See Charlie Gasparino, Bank of America to Buy 
Merrill Lynch for $50 Billion, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2008, 7:42 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708319.  
 170. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 257–64. 
 171. Additional data and charts illustrating the changes in yields on financial instruments issued 
by other large financial institutions are available from the author. 
 172. See Apanard P. Prabha et al., Market Discipline for Financial Institutions and Markets for 
Information, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND GOVERNANCE 238 (James 
R. Barth et al. eds., 2012). 
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evidence of a housing bubble became clear, the major price signals that 
should have alerted regulators to the existence of potential problems were 
nonreactive, as the below charts clearly illustrate.
  
FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 5 
 
FIGURE 6 
  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Merrill - Sr. Unsecured Debt Yield 
Last Yield
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Merrill Lynch - Sub Debt Yield 
Mid Yield To
Maturity
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2015] UNDERSTANDING THE FAILURES OF MARKET DISCIPLINE 1463 
 
 
 
 
2. Interbank Borrowing Rates Failed to Timely Signal Systemic Risk 
Market discipline also failed in identifying systemic risk. A key market 
indicator of systemic (as opposed to bank-specific) risk is the general rate 
at which banks are willing to lend to one another. The term LIBOR-OIS 
spread, which represents the difference between the London interbank 
offer rate (LIBOR)—the rate at which banks are willing to lend to one 
another—and the overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate—the rate on a 
derivative of the overnight risk-free rate, is considered a leading measure 
of bank health, as it neatly captures banks’ perceptions of the credit risk of 
lending to other banks.
173
 As discussed previously in Part II, interbank 
discipline is thought to be an important and particularly powerful source of 
market discipline, and the interbank borrowing rate, captured by LIBOR, 
is a key metric for interbank discipline.
174
 As former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan has said, “LIBOR-OIS remains a barometer of 
fears of bank insolvency.”
175
 
LIBOR-OIS is also a critical metric for shadow banking, insofar as it 
was typically used as the reference rate for virtually all subprime 
mortgages outstanding in the United States.
176
 Additionally, LIBOR is 
used as a reference rate for a number of other financial products critical to 
the shadow banking system, including more than $10 trillion in corporate 
loans, floating rate notes, and adjustable rate mortgages, and some $350 
trillion in notional value of interest rate swaps.
177
 
 
 
 173. Daniel L. Thornton, What the Libor-OIS Spread Says, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS ECON. 
SYNOPSES, May 2009. 
 174. Of course, revelations about bank manipulation of LIBOR have called into question the 
integrity of this benchmark rate. See James Surowiecki, Bankers Gone Wild, THE NEW YORKER, July 
30, 2012. That being said, LIBOR has tracked closely with other measures of bank borrowing costs, 
both before, during, and after the crisis, so it still appears to be a useful measure of bank borrowing 
costs and perceived interbank credit risk. See generally Dennis Kuo, David Skeie & James Vickery, A 
Comparison of Libor to Other Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs (unpublished manuscript, 2012), 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickery/LiborKSV_staff_webpage.pdf. 
But see Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz & D. Daniel Sokol, The Lessons from LIBOR for Detection and 
Deterrence of Cartel Wrongdoing, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 10 (2012) (arguing that the long 
period of LIBOR stability prior to August 2007 was the result of LIBOR manipulation, and thus 
LIBOR is not an appropriate measure of actual interbank borrowing costs or perceived interbank risk).  
 175. Gavin Finch & Liz Capo McCormick, Greenspan’s Libor Barometer Shows Markets Stay 
Frozen, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 23, 2009.  
 176. See DAVID GREENLAW ET AL., LEVERAGED LOSSES: LESSONS FROM THE MORTGAGE 
MARKET MELTDOWN 12–13 (2008). 
 177. See David M. Ellis, LIBOR Manipulation: A Brief Overview of the Debate (Apr. 20, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-
states/libor-manipulation.pdf.  
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As with the more bank-specific sources of market discipline (CDS, 
senior debt, subordinated debt) described above, LIBOR-OIS did not 
provide any indications of credit risk until after the onset of the subprime 
related financial markets turmoil of July 2007, as Figure 7 illustrates.
178
  
FIGURE 7 
 
 
LIBOR-OIS was not the only interbank lending signal that followed 
this pattern of unresponsiveness prior to the crisis, followed by extreme 
volatility after the onset of the crisis.
 
For example, as Gorton and Metrick 
(2009) point out, the haircuts on interbank repurchase agreement (“repo”) 
lending (short-term lending collateralized by assets) did not indicate any 
systemic risk until after July 2007, with most of the volatility in these 
haircuts coming in 2008.
179
 
 
 
 178. Abrantes-Mentz et al. argue that the triggering event occurred on August 9, 2007, when a 
number of troubling events for financial markets—intervention by the Federal Reserve and European 
Central Bank, a public warning by AIG that “defaults were spreading beyond the subprime sector,” 
and the suspension of three subprime funds by BNP Paribas—were announced. Rosa M Abrantes-
Metz et al., LIBOR Manipulation? (Aug. 4, 2008) (unpublished paper), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1201389.  
 179. See generally Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15223, 2009). As Gorton and Metrick state, 
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3. Market Pricing of ABS Failed to Timely Signal Systemic Risk 
The ABX.HE indices, which measure CDS perceptions of risk 
associated with a representative series of private-label
180
 mortgage-backed 
securities, were another important measure of market discipline that 
should have provided timely and accurate market signals of risk associated 
with the securities at the heart of the shadow banking system.
181
 ABX.HE 
price information was widely used by the financial markets to gauge and 
hedge risk related to subprime mortgage backed securities (“MBS”), 
which were at the heart of the shadow banking system during the past 
decade.
182
 For example, UBS, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley all used 
ABX.HE indices to justify their write-downs of subprime-related holdings, 
and Goldman Sachs utilized ABX.HE prices in setting the CDO prices it 
quoted when demanding collateral payments from AIG.
183
 
As with LIBOR, these ABX.HE price indices did not provide any 
meaningful signals of credit risk up until 2007. The price indices for the 
investment-grade (AAA or AA) rate securities in ABX.HE 06-01, which is 
the oldest ABX vintage and consists of asset-backed securitization deals 
issued in the second half of 2005, traded near full value (“par”) up until 
July 2007, at which point these securities experienced high price 
 
 
“haircuts” describe the difference between the value of the assets pledged to collateralize the loan and 
the value of the loan itself. Id. 
 180. “Private-label” or “non-agency” MBS are so called to distinguish them from “Agency MBS,” 
with the latter referring to mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by the government-sponsored 
enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, or the governmental agency Ginnie Mae. Private-label MBS 
have several key differences from Agency MBS, including a lack of government guarantees and 
absence of capital requirements for their issuers. See Min, supra note 34. 
 181. The ABX.HE indices were created by the financial information services company Markit and 
began trading in January 2006. They consist of “a series of equally-weighted, static portfolios of credit 
default swaps referencing 20 [home equity loan] MBS transactions,” and are meant to be used as a 
benchmark for the performance of subprime MBS. Ingo Fender & Martin Scheicher, The Pricing of 
Subprime Mortgage Risk in Good Times and Bad: Evidence From the ABX.HE Indices 5 (Eur. Cent. 
Bank Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1056, 2009). 
 182. Id. at 5 (“Despite some shortcomings, ABX price information appears to have been widely 
used by banks and other investors as a tool for hedging and gauging valuation effects on subprime 
mortgage portfolios more generally.”). Private-label subprime MBS were central to shadow banking 
on both the assets and liabilities side. On the assets side, subprime MBS conduits were critical to 
funding mortgage originations. On the liabilities side, investment-grade ABS were used as collateral in 
the repo and ABCP markets, which provided short-term liquid funding that was seen as the shadow 
banking sector’s equivalent to demand deposits for retail banking. Repos and ABCP were themselves 
purchased by money market funds, which also provided an alternative to bank deposits. See Gorton, 
supra note 25; Min, supra note 34. 
 183. See Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, The Bear’s Lair: Index Credit Default Swaps and the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. STUDIES 3250, 3251–52 (2011). 
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volatility.
184
 So for example, as of June 2007, the AAA tranches of 
ABX.HE 06-01 and ABX.HE 06-02 (the next oldest ABX vintage, which 
consisted of deals issued in the first half of 2006) traded at close to 100 
(par) in June 2007, whereas they declined significantly to trade at 92 and 
69, respectively, by June 2008.
185
  
ABX price signals were consistent with other market-based measures 
of risk, insofar as they did not indicate any concerns about credit risk
186
 
until 2007, with the investment-grade tranches not showing any price 
movements until the subprime mortgage crisis of July 2007. 
FIGURE 8: ABX INDICES (SOURCE: SABRY AND COHEN-COLE) 
 
4. Clear Evidence of Bank Risk Prior to July 2007 
These market signals failed to respond to heightened bank risk until 
after July 2007, but there were some clear and publicly available signs of 
such risk, both at particular institutions and across the financial system, 
which should have been of great concern to investors in bank and shadow 
bank liabilities. By 2005, home sales had begun to drop.
187
 By 2006, 
housing prices had started to decline after years of tremendous growth.
188
 
 
 
 184. See Fender & Scheicher, supra note 181, at 12–13. The riskier BBB and BBB- rated 
securities began to experience price declines earlier in 2007. See FATEN SABRY & ETHAN COHEN-
COLE, THE USE OF ABX DERIVATIVES IN CREDIT CRISIS LITIGATION 10 (2012). 
 185. Fender & Scheicher, supra note 181, at 13. 
 186. But see Stanton & Wallace, supra note 183 (arguing that ABX price indices do not accurately 
reflect credit risk). 
 187. See Prabha et al., supra note 172, at 249, 252 fig.13.1.  
 188. See S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index, S&P DOW JONES https://us.spindices. 
com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-index (last visited Apr. 15, 2015). 
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And by early 2007, the number of subprime mortgage originations 
plummeted,
189
 even as subprime delinquency rates began to soar.
190
  
This led to severe issues in the subprime mortgage lending industry. In 
December 2006, Ownit Mortgage Solutions, the eleventh largest subprime 
lender, collapsed.
191
 In January 2007, Mortgage Lenders Network, another 
large subprime lender, announced that it would no longer accept 
applications for new loans; it filed for bankruptcy in February.
192
 Also in 
February 2007, New Century, one of the largest subprime lenders, 
reported larger-than-expected losses, and HSBC, the largest subprime 
lender in the United States, “announced a $1.8 billion increase in its 
quarterly provision for losses.”
193
 New Century filed for bankruptcy two 
months later, in April 2007,
194
 and HSBC ultimately incurred some $60 
billion in losses from bad loans originated in North America.
195
 These 
were the first, but not last, in a long string of failures of subprime lenders. 
Ownit, Mortgage Lenders Network, and New Century, like most other 
subprime lenders, had close relationships with major financial firms such 
as Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup, which typically 
financed the loans originated by these non-bank lenders through 
warehouse loans, and in return received the right to buy and securitize the 
loans being originated.
196
 The fact that these subprime lenders began to 
fail en masse should have been reflected in higher risk premia being 
attributed to the financial firms that bought and securitized mortgages 
originated by these lenders.  
Problems with residential mortgages, particularly subprime mortgages, 
led to severe turmoil in the markets in ABS and collateralized debt 
obligations (“CDO”) by the summer of 2007. In June 2007, Bear Stearns 
suspended redemptions from a hedge fund it had sponsored, which had 
invested heavily in subprime CDOs,
197
 and then followed that up with a 
 
 
 189. See Prabha et al., supra note 172, at 252 fig.13.1. 
 190. See ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE, supra note 164, at 4–9. 
 191. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 164, at 69. 
 192. Id. at 69. 
 193. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 233. 
 194. Id.  
 195. See Steve Slater, End in Sight for HSBC’s U.S. Subprime Loans Disaster, REUTERS, Aug. 5, 
2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/05/hsbc-subprime-idUSL6N0Q74P520140 
805.  
 196. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 164, at 69. 
 197. See Matthew Goldstein, Bear Stearns’ Subprime Bath, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS WEEK, June 
12, 2007. 
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$3.2 billion bailout of the fund.
198
 These actions were insufficient to 
prevent this fund and another Bear-sponsored hedge fund focusing on 
subprime-related investments from failing in July 2007.  
Indeed, while market discipline failed to warn regulators of the large 
buildup of risk that was occurring at individual financial firms and across 
the broader banking system, there were a number of individuals who did 
precisely that. Robert Shiller, who has since won the Nobel Prize in 
Economics for his work on asset bubbles and irrational exuberance, 
repeatedly stated that housing prices were unsustainably high prior to 
2007.
199
 Economist Dean Baker argued that a housing bubble emerged as 
early as 2002.
200
 Beginning in early 2006, hedge fund manager John 
Paulson began to bet heavily against mortgage-related financial 
instruments, convinced that rating agencies and other investors had 
underestimated the risk of these securities.
201
 These and many other 
observers identified the high levels of risk being accrued in the financial 
system and at specific firms. In other words, there was sufficient publicly 
available information to recognize heightened risk—and indeed, many 
market observers and participants did recognize this risk—but this was not 
reflected in the pricing or liquidity of bank-related instruments, as the 
theory of market discipline would have predicted. 
IV. WHY DID MARKET DISCIPLINE FAIL? 
In hindsight, it is clear that bank investors did not actually rein in the 
risk taken by banks and other financial institutions as strong form market 
discipline would have predicted. More surprisingly, and in contradiction to 
the central assumptions of weak form market discipline, markets did not 
provide any signals of elevated risk, either with respect to individual firms 
or on a systemic level. Indeed, it was only after a mass downgrade of 
 
 
 198. See Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 23, 2007, at A1. This fund later failed in March 2008. 
 199. See, e.g., David Leonhardt, Be Warned: Mr. Bubble’s Worried Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 
2005, at B1, B4 (describing how Shiller warned people about a potential forty percent drop in home 
prices); David Washburn, Housing Boom Could Be Sputtering in California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., 
Dec. 25, 2004 (citing Shiller as predicting a housing decline in California due to the high number of 
short-term adjustable-rate mortgages originated there). 
 200. Dean Baker, The Run-Up in Home Prices: Is It Real or Is It Another Bubble? (Ctr. for Econ. 
& Policy Research, Briefing Paper, 2002), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/ 
housing_2002_08.pdf; see also Holden Lewis, The Bubble Sitters: Dean Baker, BANKRATE.COM (Aug. 
25, 2005), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/bakerfamily.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
8ZX3-Z6BH. 
 201. See Gregory Zuckerman, Trader Made Billions on Subprime, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2008. 
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credit ratings on major shadow banking liabilities that market discipline 
began to exert itself as theory would have predicted. So the question we 
are faced with, and which this Part attempts to answer, is: Why did market 
discipline experience such a broad and complete failure in the period 
immediately preceding the 2007–2008 financial crisis? 
Conventional wisdom argues that market discipline failed because 
some necessary condition precedent, such as sufficiently detailed 
disclosures or insufficient incentives for investors, was lacking. As I 
describe below, these lines of argument fail to acknowledge or explain the 
particular ways in which market discipline failed. Under these 
explanations, market discipline should have been dampened, but not 
nonexistent, not only in the period preceding the financial crisis, but also 
during and after the financial crisis. Yet what we saw in the period up until 
July 2007 was a complete absence of any signals of heightened risk from 
likely sources of market discipline, as described in Part II. This argument 
also fails to explain why market reactions became so suddenly and 
violently sensitive to risk-related information following the ratings 
downgrades of July 2007.  
Instead, this Article argues that the failures of market discipline are 
attributable to its conflation of two highly distinct types of financial 
instruments—those that serve as a form of investment (“investment 
securities”), and those that serve as a form of money (“money 
instruments”). Like other types of firms, banks issue investment securities, 
such as equity shares or bonds, which are meant for investment purposes. 
The purchasers of these types of securities closely monitor and react to 
risk, in accordance with the efficient markets hypothesis, as described 
previously. But banks are unique in that they also issue money 
instruments, such as demand deposits, that serve as a transactional 
medium.  
The theory of market discipline generally assumes that these money 
instruments are also risk-sensitive securities, insofar as the purchasers of 
these money instruments monitor and promptly react to new risk-related 
information. But there are strong economic reasons to question this 
assumption. As economist Gary Gorton and others have argued, because 
money instruments are primarily acquired and held as a transactional 
medium, they are most efficient when they are informationally insensitive, 
meaning when they are not reacting in price or liquidity to new 
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information about bank risk.
202
 While constant risk-based adjustments to 
pricing may be efficient from the perspective of capital investors, this is 
not necessarily the case for those seeking to use monetary instruments to 
conduct commercial transactions. For these investors, such constant 
fluctuations in pricing (and the costs and efforts of diligence entailed in 
monitoring the correct risk-adjusted price) are economically inefficient.  
The confusion between money instruments and investment securities 
has led to two critical flaws in the theory of market discipline. First, this 
doctrine tends to rely heavily on the market actions of investors in money 
instruments (such as depositors), but these investors are generally 
insensitive to new risk-related information and thus would serve as 
particularly poor monitors. Second, market discipline largely ignores the 
monitoring and disciplining conducted by shareholders (and similarly 
situated investors), who are arguably the most important and diligent type 
of bank investor, but who may have incentives adverse to those of banking 
regulators. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, a 
number of studies have made clear that shareholder pressure played a key 
role in banks’ decisions to take on greater risk, as I describe in this Part. 
Collectively, these two critiques of the theory of market discipline 
suggest a broader problem—namely, that market discipline may have the 
effect of exacerbating bank procyclicality, encouraging banks to take on 
too much risk during growth periods and too little risk during downturns. 
To the extent that money market investors may be informationally 
insensitive during most parts of the economic cycle, they should not be 
expected to provide effective and consistent market discipline. On the 
other hand, the market discipline exerted by shareholders and similarly 
situated investors, who are quite sensitive to risk-related information at all 
times, is likely to encourage greater risk-taking, particularly during 
expansionary periods. During credit contractions, both creditors and 
shareholders are likely to be excessively risk-averse, encouraging banks to 
shed more risk than is socially optimal. Thus, efforts to increase market 
 
 
 202. See Tri Vi Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (Feb. 13, 2012) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/dept/chinese/seminar/12-13/1st-term/Paper_ 
Ignorance.pdf; Gary B. Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 17777, 2012); Gary B. Gorton & Guillermo Ordonez, Collateral Crises (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17771, 2012); Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial 
Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation, 45 J. FIN. 49 (1990); James Lindley et al., The Nature of 
Banking, Information-Insensitive Balance Sheets, and Excess Reserves After the Bank Holiday of 
1933 (Nov. 19, 2009) (unpublished working paper); Gorton, supra note 25, at 4; Gorton & Metrick, 
supra note 132, at 267; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 179; see also Ricks, supra note 17. 
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discipline may lead to greater procyclicality and, perversely, may lead to 
more bank risk-taking during credit expansions. 
This Part proceeds in five sections. First, it recounts and rejects the 
standard explanations for the failures of market discipline during the pre-
crisis period. Second, it points out that the bank investors relied upon to 
provide market discipline are a heterogeneous group, as holders of money 
instruments are situated quite differently than other types of investors. 
Third, this Part argues that the heavy reliance of market discipline on 
investors in money instruments is flawed, insofar as these investors are 
generally informationally insensitive to risk. Fourth, I describe how 
market discipline tends to ignore the effects of bank shareholders, as these 
investors are seen as having interests that are misaligned with those of 
regulators, and argue that this is a critical oversight. Finally, I show that 
these explanations, currently overlooked in the literature on market 
discipline, help to explain and resolve the empirical findings, both pre-
crisis and post-crisis, around market discipline, and discuss the potential 
problem of procyclicality that may result from efforts to increase market 
discipline.  
A. Rejecting the Standard Accounts of Market Discipline’s Failure 
The typical explanation for the pre-crisis failures of market discipline 
has been that market discipline was dampened due to structural problems 
in shadow banking and securitization, which prevented market forces from 
reaching efficient outcomes. Among the problems that have been 
identified are misaligned incentives
203
 (particularly for the credit rating 
agencies),
204
 a lack of sufficiently detailed or clear information,
205
 and 
moral hazard that eroded the incentives for investors to monitor banks, 
either emanating from the existence of implicit guarantees
206
 or from the 
 
 
 203. See, e.g., Simon Potter, Exec. Vice President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Remarks on the 
Role of Central Bank Interactions with Financial Markets (Nov. 27, 2012) (arguing that “market 
discipline failed in the period before the crisis,” due to a “failure for incentives to be appropriately 
aligned”).  
 204. See, e.g., Xavier Freixas & Christian Laux, Disclosure, Transparency, and Market Discipline 
(Ctr. for Fin. Studies, Goethe Univ., Working Paper No. 2011/11).  
 205. See e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65 VAND. L. REV. 293, 298–300 
(2012) (arguing that a lack of disclosures that were useful for credit risk modeling prevented market 
discipline from operating effectively); Lee et al., supra note 166 (contending that opacity was a key 
factor in the failure of debt yields to signal increasing risk from 2001 to 2007). 
 206. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et al., The End of Market Discipline? Investor Expectations of 
Implicit State Guarantees (Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript); Prabha et al., supra note 172. 
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bankruptcy code’s strong protections for the collateral held by CDS and 
repo counterparties.
207
  
But these explanations for the failures of market discipline do not well 
describe the actual performance of market discipline before and during the 
financial crisis. It is indisputable that there were agency and information 
problems in shadow banking and asset securitization, and it seems likely 
that these detracted from the perfect operation of market discipline. It is 
also fair to point out that moral hazard may have suppressed the incentives 
for investors to monitor banks, particularly those that were seen as 
enjoying implicit government guarantees by virtue of being “too big to 
fail.” But even if we assume that these conditions served as significant 
barriers to effective market discipline, this does not explain the particular 
market reactions we observed during the period in the years before and 
after the onset of the financial crisis—longstanding and complete investor 
complacency, followed by a sudden and violent spate of activity beginning 
in July 2007.  
Of course, one important rebuttal to the argument that imperfect 
information was primarily to blame for the lack of market discipline was 
that plenty of good information about the riskiness of financial firms was 
publicly available. As one proponent of this argument acknowledges:  
[O]ne of the more difficult aspects of the Financial Crisis was that 
the very institutions whose subprime exposures were so opaque 
were the same institutions producing enormous quantities of 
mandatory disclosures. For publicly traded firms such as Citigroup, 
these disclosures included the periodic reporting obligations 
imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as 
quarterly and annual banking reports required to be filed by all 
banks and bank-holding companies. Additionally, international 
banks, subject to the Basel Accord, were required to make quarterly 
and annual public disclosures pursuant to the Accord’s “Pillar 3” 
Market Discipline provisions.
208
 
 
 
 207. See generally Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis 
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011). Roe argues that the preferential treatment given to these 
counterparties means that they bear less risk, which dulls their incentives to engage in market 
discipline. Id. at 555–60. 
 208. Bartlett, supra note 205, at 297 (footnotes omitted). As Davidoff and Hill and Ricks (2011) 
point out, regardless of what we think investors should be doing, it is fairly clear that investors in safe 
shadow banking liabilities such as MMFs or AAA-rated CDOs were not paying attention to risk 
disclosures. See generally Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 599, 601–02, 608–23 (2013); Ricks, supra note 17, at 84–89. 
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But even if we ignore this fact and accept the argument that informational 
asymmetries were significantly muting market discipline, it is difficult to 
reconcile this argument with what happened in the period preceding the 
financial crisis. After all, by 2006, home prices had begun to decline and 
the rate of delinquencies for subprime mortgages had begun to spike, 
doubling over the previous year.
209
 These indicia of risk were publicly 
available to investors, and it is certain that these were sufficiently 
abundant and clear in indicating that bank risk was rising, both 
systemically and at certain firms that had taken on uniquely high exposure 
to U.S. mortgages. And yet the pricing signals relied upon by market 
discipline did not react in any way until July 2007, as described in Part II. 
The moral hazard argument also fails to convincingly explain what 
actually happened in the period preceding the financial crisis. Moral 
hazard has generally been identified as arising from implicit “too big to 
fail” guarantees or from preferential treatment afforded by the bankruptcy 
code. But implicit guarantees are by their very nature ex post, ad hoc, and 
poorly defined, with a lack of clarity as to which liabilities are covered and 
under what circumstances. Ex ante, most investors are not certain whether 
and to what extent they might be protected against loss.
210
 Similarly, 
investors in liabilities that enjoy preferential treatment under the federal 
bankruptcy code are not shielded against all losses, and ex ante bear a 
good amount of uncertainty, including litigation uncertainty, on their 
investments. Thus, while it may seem that moral hazard exists for many 
shadow banking obligations, it is also clear that the investors affected by 
this moral hazard are not fully insulated against the prospect of credit 
losses. 
This logic is supported by the empirical research done on the value of 
implicit guarantees accruing to “systemically important financial 
 
 
 209. See Allan N. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How Will It 
End?, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Summer 2007, at 14–15. 
 210. This logic is supported by the empirical research on implicit guarantees for systemically 
important financial institutions (“SIFIs”), which generally finds that investors demand lower prices on 
securities issued by SIFIs, but that SIFIs’ funding costs are still substantially higher than the 
government’s cost of funding, indicating that investors still maintain a significant degree of 
uncertainty about the likelihood of recovery. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 80TH ANNUAL 
REPORT 23–32, 78–87 (2010); Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of England, The 
$100 Billion Question 2–3 (Mar. 30, 2010); Morris Goldstein & Nicolas Véron, Too Big to Fail: The 
Transatlantic Debate (Bruegel Working Paper No. 2011/03). In other words, investors in debt issued 
by SIFIs are less sensitive, but not necessarily insensitive, to risk. See Andrea Sironi, Testing for 
Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues, 35 J. 
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 443 (2003). 
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institutions” (“SIFIs”).
211
 While these studies generally find a cost-of-
funding advantage for SIFIs, which is attributed to the implicit guarantees 
thought to exist for these institutions, they also are quite clear in finding 
that the liabilities issued by SIFIs trade at a significant spread over the 
price of government debt issued by the SIFI home country, reflecting a 
degree of uncertainty on the degree of recovery in the event that a SIFI 
becomes insolvent.
212
 In other words, investors in SIFI liabilities are found 
to be less sensitive but not insensitive to risk.
213
  
What we would expect to see, then, if moral hazard were the primary 
barrier to the effective operation of market discipline, is at least some 
degree of market discipline taking place, as investors uncertain about their 
degree of recovery would provide some (albeit less than the optimal) 
degree of monitoring. But again, what we actually experienced was a total 
lack of any pricing of risk of bank debt or other signals that could be 
understood as market discipline, up until July 2007. In other words, even if 
we accept at face value the claim that moral hazard on SIFI-issued 
liabilities diminished investor incentives to monitor their investments, this 
line of reasoning still fails to explain the complete absence of market 
discipline in the period leading up to the financial crisis. 
Moreover, even if we assumed that the combination of moral hazard 
and informational frictions in securitization were so significant as to 
prevent all market discipline from operating, we still struggle to explain 
why markets suddenly and violently started reacting to bank risk after the 
onset of the financial crisis in July 2007. After all, moral hazard and 
informational frictions were still present after the ratings downgrades of 
July 2007. So if they were preventing market discipline from operating 
before that point, why did they cease to prevent market discipline from 
occurring after that time? The standard theories of market discipline fail to 
explain why its role in banking was curiously dormant for so long, and 
then suddenly became extremely sensitive and volatile as the financial 
crisis took hold. 
 
 
 211. See, e.g., Haldane, supra note 210; Sironi, supra note 210.  
 212. See, e.g., Sebastian Schich & Byoung-Hwan Kim, Developments in the Value of Implicit 
Guarantees for Bank Debt: The Role of Resolution Regimes and Practices, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, Mar. 
2013, at 35, 49; Sebastian Schich & Sofia Lindh, Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We 
Stand?, 2012 OECD JOURNAL: FIN. MKT. TRENDS 1, 5–7; ZAN LI ET AL., QUANTIFYING THE VALUE 
OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES FOR LARGE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.moodysanalytics.com/~/media/Insight/Quantitative-Research/Credit-Valuation/2011/2011-
14-01-Quantifying-the-Value-of-Implicit-Government-Guarantees-for-Large-Financial-Institutions-20 
110114.ashx; Acharya et al., supra note 206, at 1.  
 213. See, e.g., Acharya et al., supra note 206; Sironi, supra note 210.  
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B. Distinguishing Between Investment Securities and Money Instruments 
But if moral hazard and informational frictions are inadequate to 
explain the failures of market discipline, then how do we understand what 
happened? One key flaw in the current theoretical construction of market 
discipline is that it generally considers all bank investors to be 
homogeneous with respect to their risk sensitivity. As described above in 
Part I, the vast bulk of the theoretical and empirical literature on market 
discipline assumes that investors in bank-issued money instruments, such 
as bank depositors, closely monitor and react to risk-related information, 
and that any insensitivity to such risk is caused by the moral hazard 
created by government guarantees. But in fact, as the literature on banking 
economics and law has long recognized, banks are unique among firms 
insofar as they issue both traditional investment securities, such as stocks 
and bonds, as well as money instruments, such as checking accounts and 
demand deposits.  
As a growing literature has described, money instruments are not 
necessarily risk-sensitive in the same way as other securities, and in fact 
may be informationally insensitive, insofar as they are designed to be 
nonreactive to changes in bank risk.
214
 Under this view, money 
instruments are designed to trade at par so as to facilitate their core 
monetary function of serving as a transactional medium. During most 
periods, these securities are informationally insensitive, in that they (in 
contrast with investment securities) do not react in price or liquidity based 
on new information. It is only after some shock occurs, calling into doubt 
the safety of the issuer, when holders of these money instruments become 
sensitive to risk.
215
 As a result of this shift from informational insensitivity 
to informational sensitivity, investors no longer simply assume that the 
safety of their bank liabilities (such as deposits) is above reproach and 
suddenly begin to seek information that might tell them the riskiness of 
their bank.
216
  
As investors scramble to acquire risk-related information, the steep 
informational problems inherent to banking create a “lemons market” in 
 
 
 214. See Gorton, supra note 25, at 3–4; Ricks, supra note 17; Lindley et al., supra note 202. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, when asked what literature he recommended reading about 
the crisis, cited a number of papers written by Gorton. See David Ignatius, Editorial, Quiet Tiger at the 
Fed, WASH. POST, May 28, 2009, at A19. 
 215. See generally Gorton, supra note 25. 
 216. Gary B. Gorton, Some Reflections on the Recent Financial Crisis 20–22 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18397, 2012). I also discuss this issue supra note 18. 
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which information must be produced, but the general lack of expertise in 
producing or interpreting this information, coupled with the complexity of 
the underlying assets, leads to sharp illiquidity.
217
 As discussed above, a 
sudden lack of liquidity can cause otherwise healthy banks to become 
insolvent, due to the liquidity and maturity mismatch between their assets 
and liabilities.
218
 This dynamic can lead to a banking panic in which 
investors all rush to withdraw their funds.
219
 It is worth noting that this 
model of banking panics, describing a situation in which informationally 
insensitive investors suddenly become informationally sensitive, is largely 
consistent with the classic Diamond and Dybvig model of banking panics 
described above in Part II. 
The idea that many bank liabilities serve as a form of money has long 
been a core part of banking economics, as it is well understood that 
“[b]anks play a central role in creating and destroying money.”
220
 Indeed, 
some scholars have gone so far as to argue that money creation is “the 
essential function of banking.”
221
 As one recent article on the topic 
describes:  
It is a truism of finance that banks are in the money-creation 
business. This is not a mere figure of speech. Most bank deposits 
are included in “M1,” the Federal Reserve’s narrowest measure of 
the money supply . . . And the vast majority of deposited funds are 
redeployed by banks into loans and other forms of credit. 
Consequently, banks’ actual cash reserves typically amount to only 
a small fraction of their outstanding deposits. . . . Banks, then, really 
do augment the money supply—they create deposits that are not 
backed by ready cash. . . . To say that banks create money is just 
 
 
 217. This concept was famously coined by George Akerlof to describe a market in which 
asymmetric information between the seller and buyers exists, resulting in buyers being unable to 
distinguish between “good” and “bad” products, and thus pricing all products as if they were lemons. 
See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).  
 218. See Gorton, supra note 25, at 36–37. 
 219. As discussed above, the causes of runs and panics is a matter of some debate, with some 
scholars claiming that these can be caused by random events such as sunspots, yet others claiming they 
are based in generalized information. Gorton falls into the latter camp, but given the self-fulfilling 
nature of bank runs, the cause may be less relevant than the economic self-interest of joining a bank 
run. Some may also note that the shocks that cause informationally insensitive debt to become 
informationally sensitive under Gorton’s model resemble the eponymous “Minsky moment” described 
by Hyman Minsky. See generally Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis: An 
Interpretation of Keynes and an Alternative to “Standard” Theory, 16 NEB. J. ECON. & BUS. 5 (1977). 
 220. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 7, at 48. 
 221. Gorton, supra note 25, at 3 (emphasis added) (citing Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 202). 
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another way of saying that deposits function as money. Deposits 
serve as a common substitute for legal tender. Businesses and 
individuals use deposit accounts to “store” liquid cash reserves and 
make payments.
222
 
As a growing number of observers have noted, the creation of money is no 
longer limited to traditional banks taking deposits, but now includes the 
so-called shadow banking system described above in Part II.
223
 Like 
traditional banking, shadow banking appears to have served the core 
banking function of creating deposit-like liabilities that can serve as a form 
of money. As Ricks (2011),
224
 Gorton and Metrick (2011),
225
 Stein 
(2012),
226
 Gorton (2013),
227
 and Sunderam (2013),
228
 among others, 
describe, these shadow banking liabilities, such as ABCP and repos, 
effectively function as a cash substitute, insofar as they are safe, liquid, 
and do not fluctuate in value.
229
 Institutional investors typically refer to 
these instruments as “cash” and generally accepted accounting standards 
designate them as “cash equivalents.”
230
 In a variety of legal contexts, 
including federal bankruptcy and securities laws, these instruments are 
treated in ways that are consistent with other forms of money.
231
 In other 
 
 
 222. Ricks, supra note 17, at 76. Ricks distinguishes between money claims and safe assets, 
arguing that the term “safe assets” simply describes debt instruments with negligible credit risk, 
whereas money claims refer only to safe assets with very short durations. See Ricks, supra note 118, at 
1300–02.  
 223. See, e.g., Dang et al., supra note 202, at 3; Gorton, supra note 25; Ricks, supra note 17; 
Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy C. Stein, A Comparative-Advantage Approach to 
Government Debt Maturity 4, 22 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-035, 2010); Adi Sunderam, 
Money Creation and the Shadow Banking System (Sept. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/money_20130901_main_ca1766cc-fb1c-4b7d-b382-
2bd926d3c518.pdf; Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Short-Term Debt and 
Financial Crises: What We Can Learn from U.S. Treasury Supply 2, 19 (May 17, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.cepr.org/sites/default/files/events/papers/KRISHNAMURTHY_ 
cover%20-%20Short-term%20Debt%20and%20Financial%20Crisis.pdf; Jeremy C. Stein, Monetary 
Policy as Financial Stability Regulation, 127 Q. J. ECON. 57, 59–60, 86 (2012). 
 224. Ricks, supra note 17, at 76, 79–80. 
 225. Gorton & Metrick, supra note 179, at 10–12. 
 226. Stein, supra note 223, at 59–60, 86. 
 227. Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking 10–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper 19540, 2013). 
 228. Sunderam, supra note 223, at 1, 6–7, 13, 15–17, 22, 27–29. 
 229. Ricks, supra note 17. 
 230. See Ricks, supra note 17, at 89; see also FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 95: STATEMENT OF CASH FLOWS 6 (1987). 
 231. Ricks, supra note 17, at 89–90. As Ricks describes, shadow banking money claims are 
treated as “cash collateral” under bankruptcy laws. Id. at 90 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (2006)). They 
are exempt from SEC registration and not counted as securities in determining whether a firm must 
register as an investment company. Id. at 90. 
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words, the short-term liabilities issued in shadow banking, particularly 
ABCP and repos, are functionally equivalent to bank deposits, and like 
bank deposits, they serve as a form of money.  
Shadow banking’s money creation is largely built around “safe” AAA-
rated structured financial products such as ABSs and CDOs, which are 
used as collateral for repos and ABCP.
232
 Like bank deposits, these AAA-
rated securities are protected by subordinated securities that absorb first 
losses,
233
 and can be used as a form of payment—that is to say that they 
can be repurposed (“rehypothecated”) as collateral in other transactions.
234
 
As described above in Part III, the short-term liabilities issued by the 
shadow banking system grew to surpass traditional bank deposits. This 
reflected an enormous demand for the private money instruments created 
by the shadow banking system, which in turn created a large demand for 
AAA-rated structured securities and the assets that went into these 
securities, most notably subprime and Alt-A mortgages, but also student 
loans and credit card receivables.
235
 Put simply, private money claims 
created by the shadow banking system displaced bank deposits to a large 
degree in becoming a significant part of the overall money supply.
236
  
A central premise of the theory of market discipline is that all bank 
investors are highly sensitive to risk, and thus, in the absence of federal 
deposit insurance and the moral hazard these guarantees create, the prices 
of bank-issued securities tend to accurately reflect all publicly available 
information about risk.
237
 This assumption is closely related to the 
 
 
 232. Gorton, supra note 25, at 18, 30. 
 233. In the case of bank deposits, they are protected by equity and any unsecured debt that might 
also be issued by the bank. AAA-rated structured securities are protected by subordinated tranches, 
which include equity tranches, which receive the residuals and thus have significant upside, and 
mezzanine tranches, which receive a pre-specified rate of return so long as principal and interest 
payments are sufficient to pay the higher tranched securities. As discussed above, credit rating 
agencies and third party credit enhancements (such as monoline insurance and CDSs) are also heavily 
relied upon in shadow banking, and these can be understood as helping to promote informational 
insensitivity in this regard.  
 234. Gorton, supra note 25, at 14, 30. See also Manmohan Singh & James Aitken, The (Sizable) 
Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System 3–7, 10–12 (IMF, Working Paper 10/172, 
2010). 
 235. See Gorton & Metrick, supra note 179. 
 236. Gorton et al. (2012) note that the ratio of “safe” assets to GDP has remained relatively 
constant over time. See Gorton et al., supra note 202, at 1. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2013) provide some insight into why this might be the case, finding an inverse relationship between 
the amount of governmentally issued short-term safe and liquid debt and the amount of privately 
issued short-term safe and liquid debt. In other words, publicly backed money claims (such as 
Treasuries) crowd out private money claims, suggesting that there is a relatively constant demand for 
these types of instruments. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 223. 
 237. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.  
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efficient markets hypothesis put forth by Eugene Fama in 1970.
238
 As 
such, the literature on market discipline fails to distinguish between money 
instruments and investment securities. Deconstructing market discipline 
into its component parts—discipline provided by the purchasers of 
investment securities and discipline provided by purchasers of money 
instruments— illustrates at least two major problems with how market 
discipline is currently understood.  
C. Market Discipline Relies Heavily on Money Instruments  
One problem with market discipline revealed by this analysis is that it 
relies mostly upon the monitoring and reactions of investors in liabilities 
that are best characterized as money instruments. As described above in 
Part I, market discipline has historically focused mainly upon the reactions 
of investors in bank deposits and other short-term liquid debt obligations, 
which are understood to be forms of money. While regulators have 
encouraged banks to issue other types of debt obligations, with the goal of 
creating other sources of market discipline, deposits remain by far the 
largest source of debt funding for traditional banks, accounting for over 
eight-five percent of all liabilities at FDIC-insured institutions.
239
 
Similarly, in the realm of shadow banking, the most obvious candidates 
for market discipline are investors in securities that are thought to function 
as money instruments. In short, the overwhelming bulk of the market 
discipline currently thought to be wielded upon banks comes from 
investors in money instruments. 
The problem with the emphasis on this particular type of market 
discipline is that investors in money instruments are not particularly risk-
sensitive in the same way that investors in investment securities. Indeed, it 
is fairly clear that in the period leading up to the financial crisis, investors 
in money claims issued by shadow banks were not closely monitoring or 
reacting to risk. Whatever we may think money market investors should 
have been doing, it is clear that they were not actually engaging in 
independent risk analysis, relying instead on the credit ratings provided by 
the rating agencies.
240
 Moreover, as Ricks (2012) describes, the failure of 
money market investors to conduct credit analysis in the period preceding 
the financial crisis was not some aberration, but rather was seen as 
 
 
 238. See Fama, supra note 8. 
 239. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., SEP. 30, 2013 STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS, 
available at http://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main.asp.  
 240. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 155 , at 15, 31, 36. 
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standard industry practice.
241
 Money market managers typically do not do 
independent credit analysis.
242
 
The pricing of money instruments also supports the idea that these 
securities are not risk sensitive in the same way as investment securities. 
As fairly robust literature has found, the pricing of short-term, liquid, and 
safe securities that function as cash equivalents (such as short-term 
Treasury bills) is higher than would be suggested by standard risk-based 
pricing models, indicating that there is some independent value—beyond 
the standard risk-reward calculation that governs capital market 
investments—that accrues to money instruments.
243
 This pricing premium 
also extends to money instruments issued by the shadow banking system, 
such as ABCP and repo.
244
  
The relative risk insensitivity of money instruments can be justified in 
economic terms. As described above in Part I, it is well settled that the 
economic efficiency of investment securities is best measured by the 
expected risk-adjusted return, and so risk-based pricing of these securities 
is efficient. But money instruments serve a different (or at least additional) 
function than providing investment returns, acting as a medium of 
exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value.
245
 As a number of 
economists have argued, bank-issued money instruments are designed to 
be informationally insensitive
246
 so as to better facilitate their core 
monetary functions of serving as a store of value and as a transactional 
medium.  
Under this view, the risk insensitivity of money instruments is a feature 
and not a bug. Risk-based pricing, which results in constant changes in 
value based on changes in the perception of the issuer’s risk, is quite 
 
 
 241. See Ricks, supra note 118, at 1320–21. 
 242. Id.  
 243. See, e.g., Gregory R. Duffee, Idiosyncratic Variation of Treasury Bill Yields, 51 J. FIN. 527, 
529–37, 547–48 (1996); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand 
for Treasury Debt, 120 J. POL. ECON. 233, 234–37 (2012); Refet S. Gurkaynak, Brian Sack & 
Jonathan H. Wright, The U.S. Treasury Yield Curve: 1961 to the Present 25–28 (Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Working Paper No. 2006-28); Robin Greenwood & Dimitri Vayanos, Bond Supply and Excess Bond 
Returns (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13806, 2008). 
 244. See Sunderam, supra note 223. 
 245. See Irena Asmundson & Ceyda Oner, What is Money?, 49 FIN. & DEV. 13 (2012), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/09/basics.htm. 
 246. See generally Gary Gorton & George Pennacchi, Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity 
Creation, 45 J. FIN. 49 (1990); Tri Vi Dang et al., Ignorance, Debt and Financial Crises (Feb. 13, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.econ.cuhk.edu.hk/dept/chinese/seminar/12-
13/1st-term/Paper_Ignorance.pdf; Gorton, supra note 25; Gorton & Metrick, supra note 179; Gorton & 
Metrick, supra note 132; Gorton & Ordonez, supra note 202; Gorton et al., supra note 202; see also 
Lindley et al., supra note 202; Ricks, supra note 17. 
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inefficient for instruments meant to be used primarily for monetary 
purposes. To understand why, it may be helpful to think about what 
informationally sensitive money instruments might look like. We need not 
speculate about this, as we have an example, from the so-called “free 
banking era,”247 during which time there was no central currency and each 
bank issued its own notes, redeemable upon demand for specie that served 
the function of currency. During this period, bank notes did not necessarily 
trade at par, but rather were priced according to a number of factors, 
including the geographic distance from the issuing bank (representing the 
time it would take to get to that bank and redeem the note), and the age 
and usage of the notes (representing both how long the bank had been in 
good health and how many other merchants had accepted its notes).
248
  
In short, during the free banking period, money was, to some degree, 
informationally sensitive, with its pricing reacting to certain types of risk-
related information. Significant to this Article, this risk-based pricing of 
bank notes created significant costs on commercial transactions, due to the 
inconvenience of constantly researching and discounting the notes 
received.
249
 Thus, while these markets were relatively efficient in terms of 
pricing risk, they were quite inefficient from the perspective of conducting 
commercial transactions.  
The idea that risk insensitivity is efficient for money instruments is 
consistent with the history of banking. Banks have always gone to great 
lengths to make sure that certain of their liabilities are considered “safe” 
and do not fluctuate in response to new information about risk in the way 
that other securities do. Prior to the introduction of federal deposit 
insurance, banks made great efforts to assure investors about the safety of 
their liabilities.
250
 Bank deposits were insulated against losses by a layer 
of equity held by shareholders, who would absorb the first losses taken by 
the bank and typically were subject to double liability (twice the amount 
of the par value of their shares).  
Pre-FDIC banks also organized themselves into private clearinghouses, 
in order to promote greater access to liquidity and thus create more 
confidence among depositors. These clearinghouses developed a number 
of different methods to head off banking panics, including the collective 
suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency, the cessation of 
publishing bank-specific accounting information, and the issuance of 
 
 
 247. See supra note 97.  
 248. See Gorton, supra note 227, at 2–5. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Gorton, supra note 25. 
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clearinghouse loan certificates, which were joint liabilities of all members 
of the clearinghouse, in lieu of currency.
251
 Taken together, these 
clearinghouse mechanisms used to fight off banking panics are best 
understood as efforts meant to restore the informational insensitivity of 
bank liabilities by effectively fusing all of the individual banks into one 
large, presumably safe, super-bank and blurring the informational 
distinctions between “good” and “bad” banks within the clearinghouse.
252
 
Notably, these measures are inconsistent with the efficient markets 
hypothesis that undergirds market discipline, which suggests that good 
banks would seek to differentiate themselves from bad banks so that 
investors could more effectively discern which banks they should punish. 
They are, however, consistent with the idea that banks were seeking to 
create safe, informationally insensitive debt that could serve the role of 
private money. 
Similarly, shadow banking has in place several mechanisms to assuage 
potential concerns about the safety of its money claims, as described 
previously in Part II. Like bank deposits, many shadow banking liabilities 
are protected by subordinated investors (akin to bank equity investors) 
who stand to absorb first losses.
253
 Shadow banking also relies heavily on 
third party guarantees against losses, provided by bond insurers or credit 
default swap counterparties.
254
 The apparent safety of shadow banking 
liabilities is further bolstered by the assurances of third party monitors, 
such as credit rating agencies and ABS sponsors, who have staked their 
own reputations on the safety of these instruments.
255
 All of these 
mechanisms appear to clearly serve the purpose of assuring investors of 
the safety of the securities they hold. 
In summary, there are a number of fairly persuasive reasons to think 
that bank-issued money instruments (such as bank deposits in the 
traditional banking sector, and repos in the shadow banking sector) are not 
sensitive to risk in the same way that investment securities are. 
 
 
 251. Gorton, supra note 25, at 18–21. 
 252. Id. This general idea may have been the basis for the “Super-SIV” proposal floated by Henry 
Paulson during the early days of the financial crisis, in which investment banks would effectively 
create a clearinghouse to back the liabilities of all of their participants’ SIVs and SPVs. See Eric Dash, 
Banks May Pool Billions to Avert Securities Sell-off, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at A30.  
 253. The subordinated tranches of structured securities act as a form of equity, protecting the 
senior AAA security, which is at the heart of most of the money instruments created by the shadow 
banking system. See John W. Uhlein, Breakdown in the Mortgage Securitization Market: Multiple 
Causes and Suggestions for Reform, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 503, 508–11 (2010); Pozsar et al., supra 
note 118, at 2–4, 21–23. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See supra notes 142–59 and accompanying text. 
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Unfortunately, investors in these money instruments are supposed to be 
the primary source of market discipline of banks, suggesting a huge flaw 
in the theory.  
D. Market Discipline Ignores Risk-Sensitive Shareholders 
Another factor that may help explain the failures of market discipline 
in the period preceding the financial crisis is the role of “bad” market 
discipline—that is, market actions that may have the effect of encouraging 
greater risk-taking by banks.
256
 In particular, market discipline, as that 
concept is currently understood, mostly ignores the market discipline 
wielded by bank shareholders (and similarly situated investors), who are 
understood to sometimes have incentives to wield such bad discipline.  
The literature on market discipline, as described above, mostly focuses 
on the monitoring and discipline provided by bank creditors—primarily 
uninsured depositors, subordinated debt holders, and bank lenders—and 
largely ignores the discipline provided by equity holders.
257
 This oversight 
is in large part because, unlike creditors, equity holders are seen as having 
interests that are misaligned with, and often directly opposed to, the 
interests of regulators and others seeking to promote banking stability.
258
 
Moreover, corporate finance theory stresses that in a world without 
information frictions and transaction costs, “there is no difference between 
using bond prices or equity prices in providing information for market 
discipline purposes.”
259
 Thus, looking solely at the market discipline of 
creditors, while ignoring shareholders, is thought to be consistent with 
policy purposes. 
 
 
 256. The term “bad market discipline” is not one that has been used in the literature, which, as 
discussed in this Part, largely ignores the problem of market reactions that may encourage greater risk-
taking by banks.  
 257. See Flannery & Nikolova, supra note 102, at 92 (stating that “most of the research has 
evaluated market discipline by examining debt prices or quantities,” with only “a few studies [that] 
have looked at equity prices”). See also Anat R. Admati & Martin F. Hellwig, Does Debt Discipline 
Bankers? An Academic Myth About Bank Indebtedness (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, 
Working Paper No. 132, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2216811.  
 258. See, e.g., Anthony Saunders, Comments on Evanoff and Wall/Hancock and Kwast, 20 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES. 189, 190 (2001); Blum, supra note 86, at 1428 (noting that the heavy emphasis on 
subordinated debt in market discipline is due to the insight that these creditors bear losses but, “[i]n 
contrast to shareholders . . . they do not participate in the upward gains from such risky activities”).  
 259. Id. at 190.  
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Of course, it is well recognized that equity investors may have interests 
that are adverse to those of debt investors.
260
 There is a broad and deep 
literature, in both corporate finance and banking, discussing the potentially 
opposed incentives of different stakeholders within a single firm, 
particularly when that firm is a bank. As one leading academic has stated, 
“Equity holders have a more complex attitude towards firm risk [than 
creditors]. Equity holders have both upside potential, if the firm prospers, 
and downside potential, if the firm fails.”
261
 
Robert Merton famously showed that equity value is increased when 
firms invest in assets with higher volatility, even as this creates greater 
default risk for creditors.
262
 The potential conflicts between shareholders 
and creditors are exacerbated in the case of banks, as bank shareholders 
are thought to have incentives that may lead them to prefer greater risk-
taking than other types of shareholders.
263
 The problem of shareholder 
appetite for higher risk has been arguably exacerbated by corporate 
governance measures that have increasingly aligned the interests of 
shareholders and managers over the past several decades,
264
 as managers 
have been encouraged to take on higher levels of risk.
265
 
 
 
 260. See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis 
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979) (describing some of the contractual covenants used by 
debt investors to help control this misalignment of interests). Moreover, as Richard Squire notes, the 
problem of shareholder influence is also exacerbated by the problem of “correlation-seeking,” insofar 
as they may seek to encourage risks that only materialize upon the event of an uncertain future event. 
See generally Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
1151 (2010). 
 261. Bliss, supra note 76, at 43 (emphasis omitted). 
 262. Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, 29 
J. FIN. 449 (1974). Merton uses the Black-Scholes model of option pricing to reach his conclusions. Id. 
But see Bliss, supra note 76, at 43–44 (arguing that the use of the Black-Scholes model is overly 
simplistic, and that share prices should theoretically also consider the reduced value of future 
dividends and increased cost of funding that accompanies higher default risk). 
 263. See A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al., Deregulation, Reregulation, Equity Ownership, and S&L 
Risk-Taking, 24 FIN. MGMT. 63 (1995). Bliss (2004) and Marcus (1984) argue that this view of bank 
shareholders as parties unilaterally seeking to increase risk is overly simplistic, albeit for different 
reasons. Bliss argues that this analysis fails to consider that higher risk jeopardizes future cash flows 
and higher debt funding costs, both of which lower shareholder value. See Bliss, supra note 76, at 43–
44. Marcus points out that banks enjoy subsidized federal insurance, limited competition, and other 
economic rents that make their charters quite valuable, and that this excess charter value makes 
shareholders more inclined to want reduced risk. See Marcus, supra note 26.  
 264. Bratton and Wachter (2010) and Rock (2013) have good summaries of the efforts to improve 
corporate governance by better aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. See William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 
669–75 (2010); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1907 (2013).  
 265. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends 
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1051–56 (2012) (arguing 
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Despite these findings, up until the financial crisis, there was a notable 
dearth of research on the effects of “bad” market discipline exerted by 
shareholders.
266
 To the extent that shareholder discipline was discussed in 
the pre-crisis market discipline literature, it was almost entirely with 
respect to the “good” discipline provided by these investors, with a 
particular focus on equity-related market signals that might aid prudential 
regulators in identifying risky firms.
267
  
But as Bratton and Wachter (2010) have noted, during the 2002–2007 
period, “bad” market discipline clearly played a major role in the systemic 
buildup of risk that led to the financial crisis as bank managers responded 
to shareholder pressure to maximize earnings through higher risk and 
higher growth strategies.
268
 Banks with managers that did not fall in line 
with the paradigm of higher risk and higher returns were “stuck with a low 
stock price.”
269
 Managers who did toe the line were rewarded with higher 
profits, larger performance bonuses, and greater equity-based 
compensation.
270
 This dynamic was particularly problematic at banks in 
which shareholders held greater power, as a number of empirical studies 
undertaken after the financial crisis have made clear.
271
  
 
 
that the alignment of shareholder and manager interests through executive compensation changes led 
to outcomes that were optimal for shareholders and managers but not for the broader financial system); 
Cebenoyan et al., supra note 263, at 63 (stating “any mechanism that aligns the interests of managers 
to those of shareholders . . . may result in greater bank risk”). 
 266. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register (1995), and 
Cebenoyan, Cooperman, and Register (1999) find a positive relationship between owner control of 
banks and risk-taking. See Anthony Saunders et al., Ownership Structure, Deregulation, and Bank 
Risk Taking, 45 J. FIN. 643 (1990); Cebenoyan et al., supra note 263; A. Sinan Cebenoyan et al., 
Ownership Structure, Charter Value, and Risk-Taking Behavior for Thrifts, 28 FIN. MGMT. 43 (1999). 
But see Carl R. Chen et al., Risk-Taking Behavior and Management Ownership in Depository 
Institutions, 21 J. FIN. RES. 1 (1998) (finding a negative relationship between owner control of 
management and bank risk-taking between the period of 1988 and 1993). 
 267. See, e.g., Timothy J. Curry et al., Using Market Information to Help Identify Distressed 
Institutions: A Regulatory Perspective, FDIC BANKING REV., 2003 no. 3, at 1; Jeffery W. Gunther et 
al., Can the Stock Market Tell Bank Supervisors Anything They Don’t Already Know?, FED. RES. 
BANK OF DALL. ECON. & FIN. REV., Second Q. 2001, at 2; Richard H. Pettway, Potential Insolvency, 
Market Efficiency, and Bank Regulation of Large Commercial Banks, 15 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 219 
(1980); Greg Caldwell, Best Instruments for Market Discipline in Banking (Bank of Canada, Working 
Paper 2007-9); John R. Hall et al., What Can Bank Supervisors Learn from Equity Markets? A 
Comparison of the Factors Affecting Market-Based Risk Measures and BOPEC Scores (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2002-06, 2001); John Krainer & Jose A. Lopez, Incorporating 
Equity Market Information into Supervisory Monitoring Models (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working 
Paper No. 2001-14).  
 268. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 264, at 690. 
 269. Id. at 720–21. 
 270. Id. at 723.  
 271. For example, Beltratti and Stulz (2009) found financial firms with more shareholder-friendly 
boards of directors took on greater risk during the pre-crisis period. Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, 
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 The quantitative evidence showing that shareholder pressure was 
driving greater risk-taking among financial firms is bolstered by some 
anecdotal evidence. In July 2007, Chuck Prince, then the CEO of 
Citigroup, famously stated, while asserting that his company would 
continue to play a significant role in subprime mortgage securitization 
despite growing concerns about the risks associated with these activities, 
“When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. 
But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re 
still dancing.”
272
 This comment was widely understood as an 
acknowledgement of the strong market pressures to take risks, even in the 
face of strong indications that those risks were likely to lead to high 
losses.
273
 
Merrill Lynch was another financial firm that made a conscious 
decision to plunge into high-risk, high-margin activities to try to gain 
market share and improve its returns to shareholders. As the FCIC 
 
 
Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis? A Cross-Country Study of the Impact 
of Governance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15180, 2009). 
Laeven and Levine (2009) found that financial firms with more powerful shareholders, either because 
of investment size, shareholder protection laws, or corporate governance structures, also took on 
higher risk prior to the crisis. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, Bank Governance, Regulation and Risk 
Taking, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 259 (2009). Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman found that financial firms with 
higher performance-based pay (such as equity options or bonuses) incurred greater risk, both from 
1995–2000 and from 2001–2008, than other firms, indicating that managers with greater incentives to 
maximize short-term share value took on greater risk. Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Yesterday’s Heroes: 
Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16176, 
2010). Gropp and Köhler (2010) found shareholder-controlled banks experienced higher losses during 
the financial crisis than banks controlled by independent managers. Reint Gropp & Matthias Köhler, 
Bank Owners or Bank Managers: Who Is Keen on Risk? Evidence from the Financial Crisis (Eur. Bus. 
Sch., Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) found that banks with chief 
executive officers (CEOs) whose incentives were more closely aligned with shareholders incurred 
greater losses during the financial crisis, suggesting that “CEOs with better incentives to maximize 
shareholder wealth took risks that other CEOs did not.” Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank 
CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 12, 25 (2011). Erkens, Hung, and Matos 
(2012) found that firms with higher levels of institutional investors as shareholders took on higher risk 
during the pre-crisis period, and contended that this was due to the higher level of shareholder pressure 
exerted by these sophisticated and powerful investors. David H. Erkens et al., Corporate Governance 
in the 2007–2008 Financial Crisis: Evidence from Financial Institutions Worldwide, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 
389 (2012).  
 272. Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-Outs, FIN. 
TIMES, July 9, 2007. 
 273. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 175 (noting that in a followup 
interview with the FCIC staff, Prince clarified this comment by explaining that “banks individually 
had no credibility to stop participating in this lending business. It was not credible for one institution to 
unilaterally back away from this leveraged lending business.”); Cheng et al., supra note 271, at 1 
(stating that the Prince “quote is often attributed as market pressure (presumably being fired by 
impatient shareholders) forcing Citi’s managers to take on such risks, whether or not they fully 
understood them”).  
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documents, in July 2003, Merrill Lynch made a conscious decision to 
improve its market share in the high-margin CDO business, where it had 
fallen behind its competitors. In the following months, Merrill Lynch 
quickly became a leader in CDO underwriting, rising from 15th to 2d in 
market share between 2002 and 2004, and then became the market leader 
in CDO originations in 2006 and 2007.
274
 Merrill Lynch continued to dive 
deeply into CDOs despite the clear signs that the CDO market was 
souring, including a report by one of Merrill Lynch’s own analysts 
warning that its heavy exposure to subprime CDOs could threaten its 
earnings.
275
 
Bank executives who did take action to limit risk-taking were often 
punished for their actions. As the FCIC documents, two senior executives 
at Lehman Brothers, the head of Lehman’s fixed income group, and the 
chief risk officer, “warned against taking on too much risk in the face of 
growing pressure to compete aggressively against other investment 
banks.”276 One left the firm shortly thereafter based on “philosophical 
differences,” and the other was demoted to a policy position working with 
government regulators.
277
 In a similar example, Citi’s chief underwriter, 
concerned that Citi was taking on too much risk and ‘“join[ing] the other 
lemmings headed for the cliff,”’ made a series of vociferous warnings, 
including to Citi’s Chairman and other top executives, expressing his 
concern that Citi was facing billions of dollars in losses from poorly 
underwritten loans. After he made these warnings, he was transferred to a 
new position, was downgraded in his performance review, saw a bonus 
reduction, and went from supervising 220 employees to supervising only 
two.
278
 
Even those banks that stayed out of the high-risk, high-return activities 
that led to the financial crisis did so despite strong pressure from 
shareholders. Wells Fargo was one prominent example of a firm that 
stayed away from subprime mortgages and other risky loan products 
during the 2002–2007 period, even as most of its peers entered into these 
markets. John Stumpf, CEO of Wells Fargo, stated, “These were ‘hard 
decisions to make at the time . . . we did lose revenue, and we did lose 
volume.’”
279
 Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Bank) had a similar experience 
 
 
 274. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 104, at 202–04. 
 275. Id. at 204. 
 276. Id. at 18.  
 277. Id. at 18–19. 
 278. Id. at 19. 
 279. Id. at 108. 
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in 2006, when it decided, at the behest of its CEO Edmund Clark, that it 
would cease its activities in structured financial products. Clark, who 
justified this move by saying that he did not understand the business and 
was concerned about the potential for serious losses, recalled that stock 
analysts at the time wrote that he was an “idiot” for exiting the structured 
products marketplace.
280
  
The view of shareholder discipline as increasing, rather than reducing, 
risk is reinforced by the findings of the FSA’s Turner Review, which 
concluded that bank stock prices “failed to indicate that risks were 
increasing, but rather delivered strong market price reinforcement to 
management’s convictions that their aggressive growth strategies were 
value creative.”
281
 In short, while the literature on market discipline tends 
to ignore the effects of bad market discipline exerted by shareholders 
seeking higher risk, there is ample evidence that such bad discipline 
played a major role in bank risk-taking in the period preceding the 
financial crisis.  
E. Procyclicality and Market Discipline 
The previous sections suggest two key flaws with the market discipline 
framework as it is currently understood. First, market discipline may 
overestimate the risk-reducing effects of creditor discipline, because it 
fails to contemplate the possibility that investors in many bank liabilities 
may be informationally insensitive. Second, market discipline overlooks 
the risk-increasing effects of shareholder discipline, which may seek to 
increase risk-taking by firms, particularly during periods of economic 
growth. Taken together, these flaws suggest a potentially broader problem 
with market discipline—namely, that it may encourage and exacerbate 
procyclicality in banking. 
A central focus of regulators and policymakers following the 2007–
2008 financial crisis has been addressing the procyclicality of banks—that 
is to say, the tendency of banking intermediaries to chase trends in the 
business cycle, maximizing risk-taking during economic expansions (and 
thus creating or exacerbating bubbles) and shying away from risk during 
 
 
 280. See Ed Clark, President & CEO, Toronto Dominion Bank, Remarks at National Bank 2010 
Financial Services Conference 3 (Mar. 30, 2010), available at https://www.td.com/document/PDF/ 
investor/2010/td-investor-2010-nbf-2010-transcript.pdf; see also THOMAS H. STANTON, WHY SOME 
FIRMS THRIVE WHILE OTHERS FAIL: GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT LESSONS FROM THE CRISIS 
52–54 (2012). 
 281. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 152, at 46. 
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economic downturns (thus reinforcing the drop in economic activity and 
potentially creating a vicious circle problem).
282
 Procyclicality is seen as 
problematic, insofar as it tends to create or exacerbate bubble-bust cycles 
in asset prices,
283
 and the process by which it operates has been famously 
described as the “financial accelerator.”
284
 Banking procyclicality has 
been identified as an important and perhaps central factor in the boom-bust 
cycle that led to the 2007–08 financial crisis. Thus, a consensus has 
developed that legislators and regulators should seek to mitigate banking 
procyclicality by developing “cycle-proof” regulation.
285
 
While the procyclicality of banking is a well-documented phenomenon, 
its causes still remain somewhat unknown. There is well-developed 
literature describing the relationship between monetary policy and 
procyclicality.
286
 Others have looked to the procyclical effects of banking 
regulation, particularly regulatory capital requirements.
287
 And of course, 
there has been significant focus on the factors inherent to banking that are 
thought to encourage procyclicality, including limitations on the ability of 
bank managers to measure and understand risk,
288
 the existence of 
 
 
 282. See, e.g., BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, ADDRESSING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
PROCYCLICALITY: A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK 1 (2008) (stating that “[t]he term ‘procyclicality’ is 
generally used to refer to the mutually reinforcing (‘positive feedback’) mechanisms through which the 
financial system can amplify business fluctuations and possibly cause or exacerbate financial 
instability”). 
 283. See generally Barry Eichengreen & Kris J. Mitchener, The Great Depression as a Credit 
Boom Gone Wrong, in 22 RESEARCH IN ECONOMIC HISTORY. 183 (Susan Wolcott & Christopher 
Hanes eds., 2004). 
 284. As Borio et al. (2001) describe, the financial accelerator theory has a “long history, reaching 
back at least to Fisher (1933), and has recently been subject to extensive theoretical modeling by, 
amongst others, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).” Claudio Borio et al., 
Procylicality of the Financial System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy Options 1 n.2 (Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 1, 2001); see also Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory 
of the Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933); Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Inside the 
Black Box: The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1995, 
at 27; Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & John Moore, Credit Cycles, 105 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1997). 
 285. See, e.g., FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON 
ADDRESSING PROCYCLICALITY IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2009); JOCHEN ANDRITZKY ET AL., INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, POLICIES TO MITIGATE PROCYCLICALITY (2009); Raghuram G. Rajan, The Credit 
Crisis and Cycle-Proof Regulation, 5 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 397 (2009).  
 286. See supra note 284. 
 287. See, e.g., Michael B. Gordy & Bradley Howells, Procyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat the 
Disease Without Killing the Patient?, 15 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 395 (2006); José L. Fillat & Judit 
Montoriol-Garriga, Addressing the Pro-Cyclicality of Capital Requirements with a Dynamic Loan 
Loss Provision System (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. QAU10-4, 2010); ANDRITZKY 
ET AL., supra note 285, at 10–13.  
 288. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 282. As the IMF staff has noted, the 
quantitative models used to measure risk, particularly the Value at Risk (VaR) model that currently 
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negative externalities that prevent banks from bearing the full costs of 
their risk,
289
 and the strong bias towards short-term horizons that is 
thought to dominate bank incentives.
290
 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, concerns about banking 
procyclicality have primarily manifested themselves into a focus on the 
role of regulatory capital requirements in exacerbating the procyclical 
tendencies of banks.
291
 Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 requires federal 
banking regulators to develop and recommend countercyclical capital 
requirements.
292
 Similarly, Basel III proposes a discretionary 
countercyclical capital buffer.
293
 But neither the U.S. nor the international 
regulatory response to the recent financial crisis contemplates the idea that 
market discipline, or efforts to increase market discipline, might 
exacerbate procyclicality. On the contrary, both Dodd-Frank and Basel III 
explicitly call for enhanced market discipline.
294
  
The previous two sections, along with the empirical evidence on the 
performance of market discipline from 2002–2008, suggest that market 
discipline may exacerbate procyclicality. During periods of credit 
expansion, informationally insensitive investors in money instruments 
provide minimal market discipline, while informationally sensitive 
shareholders may encourage greater risk-taking. Conversely, during credit 
downturns, when bank creditors become informationally sensitive, they 
 
 
dominates risk management, are highly procyclical. See ANDRITZKY ET AL., supra note 285, at 4; FIN. 
SERVS. AUTH., supra note 152, at 45. 
 289. See Viral Acharya & Hassan Naqvi, The Seeds of a Crisis: A Theory of Bank Liquidity and 
Risk Taking over the Business Cycle, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 349, 361 (2012); BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, supra note 282. 
 290. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 282, at 2; Borio et al., supra note 284, at 2.  
 291. Regulatory capital requirements have increasingly become “risk-weighted” insofar as they 
utilize internal modeling and market-based assessments of risk to determine the appropriate level of 
regulatory capital. This is thought to potentially increase the procyclicality of bank credit allocation, as 
bank capital requirements fluctuate in sync with the business cycle. During a period of economic 
growth or stability, risk models tend to value assets as low risk, thus providing banks with a lower 
capital requirement and increasing the amount of credit. Conversely, during an economic downturn, 
risk models tend to value assets as high risk, leading to an increased capital requirement, which 
effectively constricts the flow of credit. See generally Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, The Procyclical 
Effects of Bank Capital Regulation, 26 REV. FIN. STUDIES 452 (2013); see also Frank Heid, The 
Cyclical Effects of the Basel II Capital Requirements, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 3885 (2007). 
 292. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010)  
 293. Basel III proposes a countercyclical capital buffer to protect against procyclicality. BASEL 
COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE 
RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 5 (2011) [hereinafter BASEL III]. 
 294. Id. at 2, 27; 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012) (stating that one of the three purposes of the newly 
created Financial Stability Oversight Council is to “promote market discipline”); 12 U.S.C. § 5394 
(2012) (mandating a study on the market discipline effects of haircuts for secured creditors). 
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may excessively and inefficiently discourage bank risk-taking. In other 
words, as the United Kingdom’s FSA stated in describing Figure 9 below, 
the combination of weak creditor discipline (such as that expressed 
through bank CDS prices) and strong shareholder encouragement 
rewarding higher risk leads to the conclusion “that market pressures from 
investors . . . were far more [procyclical]” than other factors.
295
 
FIGURE 9
296
 
 
F. Reconciling the Empirical Findings 
Importantly, this explanation for the failures of market discipline 
provides a coherent narrative for the empirical results around market 
discipline. As discussed in Part II, the pre-crisis empirical literature 
generally finds that market discipline is exerted by bank depositors, but 
that this discipline is ex post and usually only in response to indications of 
imminent bank failure. These findings are consistent with the idea that 
 
 
 295. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 152, at 46.  
 296. Id. at 46. 
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money instruments are informationally insensitive until some shock occurs 
(such as a sign of imminent failure) causing them to question the value of 
their money. Similarly, the experience of market discipline in the period 
leading up to and during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, described above 
in Part III, is also consistent with this Article’s argument. Despite rising 
levels of risk, investors in shadow banking money instruments were 
complacent up until July 2007, when the major credit rating agencies 
downgraded over 1000 AAA-rated subprime securities. This mass ratings 
downgrade created an informational shock, causing investors who were 
previously insensitive to risk to become suddenly sensitive, and creating a 
“lemons market.”297 This in turn led to a systemic panic, as investors, who 
were unable to distinguish between good and bad securities, simply “ran” 
on all money instruments issued by the shadow banking system.
298
 As 
previously described in Part III, this is exactly what we observed in the 
period from 2002 up until the financial crisis. 
V. TOWARDS A NEW MARKET DISCIPLINE 
This Article provides a framework to try to explain why market 
discipline failed in the period preceding the financial crisis, positing that 
the understanding of market discipline held by most academics and 
regulators is critically flawed in two ways—it relies most heavily upon 
investors in money instruments who are relatively insensitive to risk, and 
ignores the very risk-sensitive investors who may seek to encourage 
greater risk. This framework leads to some important implications for the 
current banking regulatory regime, which I lay out in broad strokes below. 
It should be emphasized that most of the prescriptions below are extremely 
preliminary, and require further research. Illustrating that the current 
consensus around market discipline is wrong, which is the primary focus 
of this Article, provides us with some obvious next steps, but further 
research is required to help us understand when and to what extent market 
discipline may be useful in the regulation of financial institutions.  
 
 
 297. See supra note 217. 
 298. A traditional banking panic involves depositors running to their bank to withdraw their funds. 
The shadow banking panic of 2007–2008 involved institutional investors demanding higher levels of 
overcollateralization and/or refusing to roll over short-term debt liabilities. The end result, of course, 
was the same, with shadow banks struggling to find short-term liquidity to meet their obligations. See 
Gorton, supra note 25, at 32–37. 
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A. Implications for Financial Regulatory Reform 
Any critical analysis of market discipline would represent a significant 
departure from the current stance of regulators and policymakers. Since 
the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke, who was Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve from 2006 up until January 31, 2014, has repeatedly stressed the 
need to improve the conditions for market discipline in banking.
299
 This 
sentiment has been echoed by other senior Federal Reserve officials
300
 and 
banking regulators.
301
 The Squam Lake Report, a set of recommendations 
on financial regulatory reform created by some of the leading banking and 
financial experts in the country, including current Federal Reserve 
Governor Jeremy Stein and recent Nobel Prize winner Robert Shiller, 
explicitly lauds the “disciplining effect of short-term debt,” which it states 
“makes management more productive” and prevents bank laxity in risk 
management.
302
 Most short-term debt issued by banks and shadow banks 
serves the function of money, as described above.
303
 
This emphasis on greater market discipline is evident in all of the major 
attempts to reform financial regulation, most notably Basel III, Dodd-
Frank, and the rulemaking being undertaken by U.S. financial regulators. 
Generally, the post-crisis efforts to enhance market discipline have taken 
three forms: eliminating expectations of government support, increasing 
issuance of long-term debt, and improving transparency.  
 
 
 299. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, On the Implications of 
the Financial Crisis for Economics (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20100924a.htm; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. of 
Governors, The Crisis as a Classic Financial Panic (Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20131108a.htm; Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. 
Reserve Bd. of Governors, The Federal Reserve: Looking Back, Looking Forward (Jan. 3, 2014), 
available at http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20140103a.htm.  
 300. See, e.g., Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded 
Bailouts: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Jeffrey M. 
Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond); Esther L. George, President, Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Kansas City, Effective Supervision: Balancing New and Traditional Approaches (Nov. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/speeches/2013-george-Paris-11-22.pdf; Daniel Tarullo, 
Member, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Towards Building a More Effective Resolution Regime: 
Progress and Challenges (Oct. 18, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
speech/tarullo20131018a.htm. 
 301. See, e.g., Mike Konczal, Sheila Bair: Dodd-Frank Really Did End Taxpayer Bailouts, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (May 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/18/ 
sheila-bair-dodd-frank-really-did-end-taxpayer-bailouts, archived at http://perma.cc/43NH-RX2Z (an 
interview with former FDIC Chair Sheila Bair, in which she describes the importance of increasing 
market discipline going forward). 
 302. KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 44 
(2010).  
 303. See generally Sunderam, supra note 223. 
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1. Eliminating Expectations of Government Support is Unlikely to Fix 
Market Discipline 
Financial regulators attempting to implement Dodd-Frank’s Orderly 
Liquidation Authority
304
 have sought to create a resolution process for 
SIFIs that convincingly ends creditor expectations of being “bailed out” by 
the government in the event of a crisis. The idea here, as Federal Reserve 
Governor Daniel Tarullo has stated, is to eliminate moral hazard and 
restore market discipline wield by these creditors.
305
 The underlying 
premise of this approach is that expectations of bailouts by bank investors 
are the primary barrier to the effective operation of market discipline. 
But if the analysis in this Article is correct, this approach of ending 
bailouts is unlikely to be successful in addressing the failures of market 
discipline we saw in the past decade.
306
 As discussed above, market 
discipline is generally expected to operate through the reactions of 
investors in certain short-term banking liabilities, such as deposits, repos, 
and ABCP, which serve the function of money. To the extent that these 
instruments are structurally designed to be “safe,” with subordinated 
securities, credit ratings, and third party guarantees to assuage investor 
concerns about credit risk, as described above in Part IV, it is not clear that 
expectations of government support actually impact the risk sensitivity of 
investors in these liabilities. Thus, ending bailouts does not appear to be a 
panacea to the failures of market discipline. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that the share of bank-issued 
obligations that serve the function of money, what Gorton et al. called 
“safe assets,” has remained relatively constant over time.
307
 This suggests 
that even if regulators go further and manage to convince investors that 
certain shadow banking liabilities currently understood to function as 
money (such as repos and ABCP) are not actually safe and liquid 
instruments, this will simply drive these investors into other financial 
instruments that they perceive as safe and liquid. Thus, the findings of this 
 
 
 304. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203, §§ 201–
217, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).  
 305. Tarullo, supra note 300, at 2. 
 306.  Of course, there are other reasons for eliminating implicit “too big to fail” guarantees. For 
example, implicit guarantees may be seen as unfair, transferring dollars from taxpayers to bank 
investors, or they may be seen as creating an unwieldy political and regulatory environment. See, e.g., 
William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Ending Too Big to 
Fail, Remarks at the Global Economic Policy Forum (Nov. 7, 2013) (describing some of the reasons 
why implicit government guarantees are seen as problematic).  
 307. Gorton et al., supra note 202, at 4.  
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Article suggest that the strong drive to eliminate expectations of 
government bailouts is unlikely to be effective in fostering greater market 
discipline.  
2. Increasing Issuance of Long-Term Debt 
Regulators have also proposed increasing the amount of long-term 
debt, such as subordinated debt or senior unsecured debt that banks must 
issue. Basel III strongly encourages traditional banks to issue more 
subordinated debt by allowing this type of obligation to be considered Tier 
1 capital.
308
 The Federal Reserve has also proposed imposing a capital 
surcharge on wholesale funding to encourage shadow banks to utilize 
more long-term debt funding.
309
 The rationale behind this approach is to 
discourage short-term funding and the risk of runs it creates, but by 
fostering more investments in long-term debt, it may, at least in theory, 
provide more effective market discipline since long-term debt investors 
should be more risk-sensitive than investors in short-term liquid liabilities. 
The theoretical arguments made in this Article would support the 
issuance of more long-term debt. Subordinated debt is not a money 
instrument, and thus its investors would potentially be more sensitive to 
risk than would owners of money liabilities. Moreover, unlike 
shareholders, investors in subordinated debt and other long-term debt have 
interests that are largely aligned with those of regulators, insofar as they 
want to efficiently minimize risk, particularly systemic risk. Thus, 
encouraging or requiring financial institutions to issue more subordinated 
debt (and other long-term debt) would theoretically enhance the 
effectiveness of market discipline. 
But there are a couple of reasons to temper our optimism about the 
potential for subordinated debt. First, subordinated debt is relatively 
expensive, and so efforts to merely encourage rather than require its 
issuance may not lead to enough issuance such that it can be relied upon to 
provide an effective source of market discipline. Following the passage of 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Federal Reserve and Treasury 
Department undertook a joint study on the feasibility of requiring banks to 
 
 
 308. BASEL III, supra note 293, at 15–17. 
 309. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. Of Governors, Shadow Banking and 
Systemic Risk Regulation 12–13 (Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm; see also Noam Noked, Fed Outlines Proposals to Limit 
Short-Term Wholesale Funding Risks, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 3, 
2014, 9:00 AM), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/01/03/fed-outlines-proposals-to-limit-
short-term-wholesale-funding-risks/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y4HD-YUX2. 
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issue subordinated debt.
310
 This study concluded that while there were 
likely to be market discipline-related benefits from more subordinated 
debt, the uncertain nature of these, along with the high costs of 
subordinated debt, did not justify requiring bank subordinated debt.
311
 
Indeed, at the end of 2013, FDIC-insured institutions had issued only 
$99.7 billion in subordinated debt, as compared to $11.2 trillion in 
deposits. 
Second, subordinated debt has a decidedly mixed record in promoting 
market discipline. As described above in Part II, the pre-crisis empirical 
studies on subordinated debt discipline had mixed results. While most 
(although not all) studies found that subordinated debt investors did exert 
market discipline,
312
 there is very little evidence that this market discipline 
actually impacted bank behavior.
313
 Perhaps more importantly, long-term 
debt prices (such as subordinated debt and senior unsecured debt) 
completely failed to respond to heightened bank risk prior to the financial 
crisis.
314
 
In summary, encouraging the issuance of more subordinated debt and 
other long-term unsecured debt may enhance market discipline, but given 
the failures of subordinated debt in the recent pre-crisis period, more 
research on the effectiveness of such efforts in promoting market 
discipline is necessary before coming to a conclusion on this matter. 
3. Improving Transparency 
Third, financial reform efforts have sought to increase the quantity and 
quality of disclosures made by banks to help reduce the information 
asymmetries thought to be holding back market discipline. Basel III 
purports to increase the transparency of bank capital by requiring more 
detailed disclosures around what kinds of capital are being held.
315
 U.S. 
banking regulators have implemented Basel III’s recommended disclosure 
requirements relating to capital structure, as well as a number of other 
requirements relating to credit risk exposures.
316
  
 
 
 310. See generally supra note 66. 
 311. Id. at 56. 
 312. See supra note 67. 
 313. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 86 and text accompanying note 87. 
 314. See, e.g., supra FIGURE 2, FIGURE 3, FIGURE 5, FIGURE 6; Lee et al., supra note 166. 
 315. BASEL III, supra note 293, at 27. 
 316. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital and Implementation of Basel III, 78 Fed. Reg. 
62,018, 62,128–131 (Oct. 11, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 165, 167, 208, 217, and 
225).  
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The idea that greater transparency supports public policy purposes has 
long been a guiding principle of capital markets regulation, but this has not 
been the case for the prudential regulation of banks, in which opacity was 
long preferred, because of the fear that greater transparency might cause 
bank runs.
317
 Indeed, it is notable that the original 1933 Securities Act 
specifically exempted from its disclosure requirements any security issued 
by “any national bank, or by any banking institution organized under the 
laws of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, the business of 
which is substantially confined to banking . . . .”
318
 Historically, banking 
regulators discouraged the disclosure of bank information to the investing 
public
319
 because they did not want to trigger bank runs with the release of 
adverse information.
320
 It was only beginning with the enactment of 
FDICIA in 1991 that banking regulation began to embrace disclosure and 
transparency. 
The arguments raised in this Article suggest another reason, besides the 
fear of bank runs, why greater opacity may be preferable for banks. During 
periods of credit expansion, greater transparency may serve to increase 
bank risk-taking. If most bank creditors, who are understood to prefer less 
risk, are informationally insensitive, the production and disclosure of 
additional information would be essentially useless for these investors. At 
the same time, risk information is highly useful for bank shareholders and 
similarly situated investors, who may prefer greater risk-taking. Thus, 
more transparency may, perversely, lead to greater risk-taking by banks 
under some circumstances. Obviously, this hypothesis needs further 
research, but despite the fact that it goes against the general preference for 
greater transparency, it appears to be supported by a good deal of recent 
empirical evidence, including the absence of good market discipline from 
informationally insensitive creditors, and the large amount of bad market 
discipline from shareholders, described above in Part III. Adding to this 
argument is the research of Kwan (2004), who found that banks take on 
more risk when they are publicly traded (and thus have more consistent 
market discipline from stock and bond prices) than when they are privately 
 
 
 317. See Donald C. Langevoort, Global Securities Regulation After the Financial Crisis, 13 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 799, 810–11 (2010).   
 318. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012). 
 319. See Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 83 
(1976). 
 320. See Robert E. Barnett et al., Deposit Insurance: The Present System and Some Alternatives, 
94 BANKING L.J. 304, 316–17 (1977); Herbert D. Miller, Banks and the Securities Act of 1933, 84 
BANKING L.J. 95, 97 (1967). 
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owned.
321
 These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that greater 
disclosures may actually encourage higher risk-taking at banks.  
B. Delinking the Incentives of Managers and Shareholders 
The arguments made in this Article also lead to some important 
recommendations for additional reforms, above and beyond those offered 
by Dodd-Frank and Basel III. One of these recommendations is to delink 
the incentives of bank managers and shareholders. 
As Part III describes, policymakers have increasingly sought to align 
the incentives of managers and shareholders over the past several decades 
as part of the broader movement to improve corporate governance. 
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars began to question the then-existing 
paradigm for corporate management, in which managers were seen as 
loyal to the corporation as a whole, with fiduciary duties to all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.
322
 These scholars argued managers 
should be seen as agents of the corporate “owners,” namely, the 
shareholders of the company. Thus, the focus shifted to looking at the 
principal-agent relationship between shareholders and owners and the lack 
of alignment of incentives between the two as a classic agency cost 
problem.
323
  
Shareholder advocates began a robust campaign to improve the rights 
of shareholders and minimize agency costs in the 1980s through new 
legislation, rules, common law, and best practices standards, which still 
continue today.
324
 These include shareholder-friendly changes to corporate 
voting practices, greater ability to propose changes to corporate charters, 
and say-on-pay votes,
325
 as well as increasing use of equity- or 
performance-based compensation of managers, increasing managerial 
turnover, and greater shareholder activism.
326
 The result of these changes 
was to more closely link the interests of managers and shareholders across 
all industries, including financial services and banking.  
But as Part IV illustrates, bank shareholders have incentives that are 
not aligned with those of public policy. Thus, the move to unify the 
incentives of shareholders and managers is one that may be adverse to the 
 
 
 321. Kwan, supra note 92, at 6. 
 322. See Rock, supra note 264, at 1911–17. 
 323. See generally id. 
 324. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 264, at 669–73. 
 325. Id. 
 326. See Rock, supra note 264, at 1917–26 
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interests of bank safety and soundness. Moreover, if, as this Article 
contends, outside creditor discipline does not provide a significant check 
on bank risk-taking, then this unification of shareholder and manager 
interests becomes even more concerning, particularly during periods of 
credit expansion when shareholders typically want to take on much greater 
risk. 
The arguments in this Article would strongly suggest that delinking the 
incentives of managers from those of shareholders is an important step 
towards reducing bank risk and procyclicality.
327
 This includes 
eliminating or reducing equity- or performance-based compensation, 
establishing greater managerial independence from shareholders, and other 
measures meant to more aptly emphasize long-term franchise value rather 
than be fixated with short-term share value. 
C. Reducing Reliance on Market Discipline 
Another policy prescription that clearly follows from the arguments in 
Part IV is a reduced reliance on market discipline as a supplementary 
prudential tool. Regulators have relied heavily on market discipline to 
assist them in their oversight of increasingly large and complex financial 
institutions. As a result, deemphasizing market discipline has at least two 
fairly radical implications for banking regulation: increasing capital 
requirements and reducing the size and complexity of financial 
institutions. 
1. Increasing Capital Requirements 
If market discipline is less effective and reliable than has been 
generally understood, then it is necessary to compensate by strengthening 
other prudential tools. Given that capital requirements are the most 
important regulatory device in constraining risk, it stands to reason that 
increasing capital requirements is an important, and perhaps necessary, 
 
 
 327.  As has been noted by a number of scholars, one important structural feature that may have 
served to constrain bank risk-taking in the past is expanded shareholder liability, in which shareholders 
could lose not only the value of their shares but also an additional amount (typically double the par 
value of the share, and sometimes even more than that). See generally Kris James Mitchener & Gary 
Richardson, Does “Skin in the Game” Reduce Risk Taking? Leverage, Liability and the Long-Run 
Consequences of New Deal Banking Reforms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
18895, 2013). Bringing back expanded liability to bank shareholders might help to align the interests 
of shareholders and regulators, but it would need to be beyond par value, which typically makes up 
only a very small fraction of a bank’s share price today. Moreover, this idea would seem to be 
politically impracticable.  
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measure in response to the failures of market discipline. To put it another 
way, market discipline was theorized as providing regulators with an early 
warning system that would identify risky institutions. If this detection is 
flawed, as this Article suggests, then the obvious conclusion is that 
regulators must increase protections against bank risk. Capital 
requirements are the most effective means of doing so. 
2. Reducing the Size and Complexity of Financial Institutions 
One of the main reasons why market discipline has been increasingly 
emphasized over the past several decades is that the growing size and 
complexity of financial firms has left regulators feeling outmatched. As 
one leading scholar has stated: 
Financial institutions have become increasingly complex and 
opaque. This is particularly true of the largest financial 
organizations with large derivatives positions and off-balance-sheet 
activities. Securitizations and associated residuals present 
challenges to both accountants and supervisors attempting to value 
the firm’s assets and liabilities. This is coupled with the increasing 
concentration in the financial markets, particularly for derivatives. 
Thus, while the largest firms are becoming difficult to examine and 
supervise prudentially, the potential adverse impact of their failure 
is also increasing. . . . Regulators have become increasingly 
uncomfortable with shouldering the primary burden for supervising 
large financial institutions. They realize that the complexity and 
valuation of modern financial engineering products may be beyond 
the ken of most examiners. This problem is exacerbated by a 
scarcity of regulatory resources. The regulatory logic for increased 
market discipline presumes that market participants may be 
collectively more able to monitor banks activities than understaffed 
regulators or at least to provide a more continuous oversight.
328
 
If market discipline cannot be relied upon to consistently provide timely 
warnings of high levels of bank risk, then we are faced with an alarming 
dilemma. Regulators are unequipped to understand and oversee large and 
complex financial institutions by themselves, so they have increasingly 
relied upon market signals to assist them in their prudential oversight 
responsibilities. But these market signals are flawed, for the reasons 
 
 
 328. Bliss, supra note 76, at 39. 
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outlined in this Article. The unsettling conclusion of this logic, then, is that 
regulators are unable to effectively supervise large and complex financial 
institutions for safety and soundness.  
What this suggests is that we may have reached a point where banks 
are not only “too big to fail,” but are also “too big to regulate.” So far, in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, policymakers and regulators have 
been reluctant to take overly aggressive measures to reduce bank 
concentration and complexity. But if it is true that bank regulators are 
simply not capable of effectively understanding and constraining risk at 
large and complex financial institutions, this presents a new and powerful 
reason for taking this course of action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Market discipline has become an essential pillar of banking regulation 
in the past several decades. However, the law and economics literature has 
overlooked the fact that during the period preceding the 2007–2008 
financial crisis, market discipline failed to provide any warnings of the 
impending problems ahead. These failures make clear that a major 
rethinking of market discipline theory is necessary. This Article attempts 
to provide a two-pronged explanation to help explain the experience of 
market discipline from 2002 to 2008, in a way that is consistent with the 
existing research on market discipline. Under this framework, market 
discipline may fail to provide timely warnings of risk, to the extent that it 
is based on informationally insensitive securities, and shareholder 
discipline may lead to heightened risk-taking, the effects of which should 
not be ignored by regulators. It is my hope that the findings and arguments 
in this Article spark a critical reexamination of the use of market discipline 
as a prudential tool along the lines suggested herein. 
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